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INSURING AGAINST TERRORISM
-AND CRIME
Saul Levmore* and Kyle D. Logue**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The attacks of September 1 1th produced staggering losses of life
and property. They also brought forth substantial private-insurance
payouts, as well as federal relief for the City of New York and for the
families of individuals who perished on that day. The losses suffered
during and after the attacks, and the structure of the relief effort, have
raised questions about the availability of insurance against terrorism,
the role of government in providing for, subsidizing, or ensuring the
presence of such insurance, as well as the interaction between relief
and the incentives for taking precautions against similar losses in the
future. In response to such losses, and in anticipation of others, one
might imagine an array of government responses

ranging from

nonintervention, to subsidized private insurance, to after-the-fact
government payments of a fixed or uncertain kind.
It is our claim that the particular mix of responses the government
has chosen with respect to 9/1 1 , including the September 11th Victims'
Compensation Fund1 and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,2
will significantly affect private expectations about the government's
likely response to future terrorist attacks. These expectations will in
turn affect future private actions, ranging from the types of insurance
policies

that

will

be

written,

to

the

character

of

real

estate

development that will take place (especially in the country's largest
cities), and to the level of charitable contributions that will be made
following any future terrorist attack. The causal arrow can also point

Dean & William B. Graham Professor of Law,, University of Chicago Law
*
School. - Ed.
**
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed. We are grateful for
comments received from colleagues at faculty workshops at the University of Michigan and
University of Chicago, and from Dean Bachus, John Duffy, Tim Mygatt, and Bryan Ray.
Portions of the research for this project were generously funded by the Cook and Elkes
Funds at the University of Michigan Law School and by the many friends of the University
of Chicago Law School.

1. U.S. Air Transportation and Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2000)) [hereinafter
ATSSS Act].
2. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322
[hereinafter Terrorism Risk Insurance Act].
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in the opposite direction. Future political actors may evaluate private
responses to the risk of terrorism in deciding on the character or
degree of a governmental response.
One aim of this Article is the exploration of the relationships
between promised or expected government actions (or inactions) and
private decisions regarding terrorism risk. These issues lead to some
novel ideas about the role of government in insuring against terrorism
- and then against crime more generally. In Part II we begin with
some background on the response of the private-insurance market and
the federal government to the losses resulting from September 11th.
Part III looks at the positive question of how government and private
actors should be expected to respond to the losses of 9/11 and to the
prospect of such losses in the future. It explores the interactions
between government relief and charitable responses to 9/11 , as well as
the existence or absence of private insurance, and it draws contrasts
between terrorism disasters and natural disasters, as well as between
9/11 and prior terrorist attacks. Part III also analyzes the
circumstances in which episodic relief of the 9/11 variety will lead to
(or be replaced by) more permanent, routinized relief, as is available
in some other countries.
Part IV takes up the normative question of the optimal mix of
government and private relief (including insurance) for terrorism
related losses. It provides a skeptical view of government intervention
in property-insurance markets generally and of the particular federal
terrorism-reinsurance regime that Congress recently adopted. Part V
then broadens the inquiry by arguing that, whatever one thinks of the
case for government-sponsored terrorism compensation or insurance,
the case for government-sponsored insurance against crime - which is
to say a much broader set of crimes than terrorism alone - is at least
as sound. Part VI concludes. Throughout the Article, we refer to
"insurance" and government "relief" because specific programs and
reactions have been in the form of insurance-market interventions and
relief programs. But we also use

these

expressions to refer to

government payments, subsidies, and liability rules more generally. It
is the larger questions we are after, and those concern the
government's role in preventing losses and in compensating victims
following certain events.
II.

INSURANCE, RELIEF, AND THE EVENTS OF 9/11

The terrorist attacks of September 1 1 th produced an enormous set
of losses, some insured through private markets and some not. Insured
loss estimates range from 30 to 100 billion dollars, and include
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property-, liability-, workers-compensation-, and life-insurance claims.3
Much of the damage done on 9/1 1 to private property and private
economic interests was insured through policies sold by insurance
companies, although substantial damage was inflicted . on publicly
owned facilities in lower Manhattan, including the New York City
subway system, that were likely underinsured.4 To this we add the
staggering loss of nearly 3000 lives,5 some completely uninsured and
many underinsured by any plausible standards of measurement. The
total loss dwarfs that of any other single-day disaster or insurable
event in U.S. history, at least since the major battles of the great wars
and the Galveston hurricane of 1900 in which 6000 people perished,6
and rivals the losses experienced in the Kobe, Japan earthquake of
1995, which may be the most costly natural disaster in modern history.7
When thinking about these issues, it makes sense to separate the
loss of property, private and public, from the loss of life and limb, in
large part because the present mix of private and public insurance, and
of relief generally, is different for property than it is for persons. In
addition, government relief or compensation for lost property presents
somewhat different moral-hazard issues than does relief for lost life;
the politics of relief may also differ. We consider these important
differences below.
A.

Losses to Property

The bulk of private property losses suffered in the 9/11 attacks was
covered by private insurers. Some claims remain in dispute, of course,
but by and large the assets that were lost, including buildings, aircraft,

3. See, e.g., TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 4, http://www .tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/reports
(restricted page, last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Robert P. Hartwig, Insurance Information
Institute, The Long Shadow of September 11: Terrorism and Its Impacts on Insurance and
Reinsurance Markets, Presentation to the Insurance Information Institute (July 15, 2002), at
http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/binary/687221_1_0/septll.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
The largest source of variation in the estimates of insured losses appears to be the widely
varying assessments of the amount of tort liability that will ultimately arise out of the events
of 9/11. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra, at 4 (showing estimates of liability-insurance
coverage of between five billion and twenty billion dollars; see also Edward Wyatt et al.,
After 9111, Parcels of Money, and Dismay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at Al (detailing the
allocation of $21.3 billion of federal aid to various programs).
4. See infra notes 12 & 13.
5. The official death toll from the 9/11 attack was recently reduced to 2,752. Dan Barry,
A New Account of Sept. 11 Loss, With 40 Fewer Souls to Mourn, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
2003, at Al.
6. The 1900 Storm, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, at http://www.1900storm.com/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003) (discussing the Galveston disaster).
7. See Richard L. Holman, New Estimates of Quake Damage, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1995,
available at 1995 WL 2109467. See generally TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra
note 3, at 4.
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and office contents, were insured

under conventional

insurance

policies that did not (following conventional practice) exclude losses
from terrorism.8 The federal government did and will provide some
relief for losses of uninsured private property, but this relief often
takes the form of subsidized loans and is small in comparison with the
role of private insurance.9
The picture is quite different with respect to losses to public
property. The largest such losses associated with

9/11

in New York

City concern damage to the subway system in lower Manhattan.10 The
Metropolitan Transportation Authority claims that those losses will be
covered mostly by private-insurance policies, with only relatively small
amounts coming from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA") and its state equivalent to fill in the gaps. 1 1 We suspect,
however, that when all of the insurance claims have been finally
settled and when all of the damages to public facilities (not just the
subways) are taken into account, the amount to be covered by
government relief dollars will represent a sizeable fraction of the total

8. This conclusion assumes that the "war risk" exclusion will either not be invoked by
insurers or, if invoked, will be found by courts not to apply to the 9/11 attacks. See infra
note 36.
9. In general, after a "major disaster" has been declared by the President (which comes
only after state and local governments have responded and the governor of the affected state
has requested a disaster declaration from the President), individuals and businesses that have
suffered uninsured property losses or temporary job losses as a result of the disaster become
eligible for loans from the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), and, in some cases,
modest grants administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA").
When homes have been damaged, loans can be issued for up to $200,000 and loans to replace
damaged personal property can reach $40,000. Businesses can receive loans up to $1.5
million to repair or replace damaged property. The loans may carry subsidized rates of
interest, but they must be repaid in full. Individuals or families who do not qualify for these
loans, typically those with very low incomes or no collateral, can receive up to $14,800 from
FEMA in the form of one-time grants. Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock,
Alternative Means of Redistributing Catastrophic Risk in a National Risk-Management
System, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 51, 68-69 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE DISASTER PROCESS AND DISASTER
Am PROGRAMS, at http://www .fema.gov/library/dproc.shtm (last updated Feb. 12, 2003)
10. According to a report of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority
substantial damage was to the subway tunnel running
underneath the World Trade Center Towers - the Interborough Rapid Transit lines
numbers 1 and 9 - which will need to be completely rebuilt, and the related stations and
infrastructure, as well as damage to the N/R Line Cortlandt Street Station. The total
property damage to the transit system is estimated to be $855 million. See METRO. TRANSP.
AUTH., 2002 COMBINED CONTINUING DISCLOSURE FILINGS app. A at 7-9, at
http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/investor/pdf/2002app-a-v2.pdf/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2004).

("MTA"), the most

11. METRO. TRANSP. AUTH., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 13, 14, 18, http://www.mta.nyc.ny.
us/mta/investor/pdf/annualreport2001.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004); METRO. TRANSP.
AUTH., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEARS ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 2001 AND 2000 , at 3, http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/investor/pdf/
2002annualreport_financials.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004) (hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT] .
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losses.12 Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the federal funding that has
already been earmarked for the reconstruction and overhauling of
lower Manhattan strongly suggests that the federal government will
end up bearing a substantial portion of the lossesY
Apart from the physical damage to property, many New York
businesses

also

aftermath of

9/11 .

experienced

substantial

monetary

losses

in

the

Focusing solely on the businesses in and around the

World Trade Center site, the lost profits during the period of recovery
and reconstruction have been undoubtedly enormous. Indeed, the
total private-insurance payouts for "business interruption" coverage

12. This suspicion is justified by the available evidence. While the total property losses
to the subway system are estimated to be $855 million, the MTA apparently has submitted
only $685 million in insurance claims for 9/11-related property losses. Apparently, the
difference may be attributable to the actual subway cars that were destroyed and that were
not insured. Another suggestive (though certainly not dispositive) piece of evidence is that
the MTA, in its 2000-2001 financial statements, did not include any amount for expected
insurance recovery because the "Authority is pursuing the resolution of various
contingencies with the insurance providers." COMPREHENSIVE ANNUA L FINANCIAL
REPORT, supra note 11, at 39. What this means, of course, is that the insurers may interpret
the relevant insurance policies somewhat differently than the MTA does. In addition,
however, one would expect a general tendency for municipalities to underinsure given the
prospect of FEMA (or Department of Transportation ("DOT")) relief.
13. A total of twenty-one billion dollars of federal funds has been allocated for the New
York recovery effort. See Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Releases
Updated Summary of Government Expenditures Directly Related to September 11th
Attacks (Sept. 10, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2002-61.pdf (last visited
Apr. 12, 2004). Of that amount, $5.5 billion is designated for reconstructing, replacing,
overhauling, and upgrading the infrastructure damaged by the attacks. Press Release, Office
of Management and Budget, President Submits $27.1 Billion Emergency FY 2002
Supplemental Appropriations Request, Provides Resources for the War on Terrorism,
Homeland Security and Economic Recovery (Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/pubpress/2002-16.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). Of that amount, $4.55 billion will
apparently go to transportation-related infrastructure expenditures - $2.75 billion coming
from FEMA and another $1.8 billion coming from DOT. The money will be jointly
administered by FEMA and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Transit
Administration. Edward Wyatt, Money for Just Some of a Transit Wish List, N.Y. nMES,
Aug.13, 2002, at B4; see also Charles V. Bagli & Randy Kennedy, Old or New? Debate Rages
Over Transit Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at Bl; Press Release, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA and FTA Announce Aid To Revamp
Transportation Network For Lower Manhattan (Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.fema.gov/news/
newsrelease.fema?id=5529 (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). Although much of this money may be
used to "upgrade" the subway system in lower Manhattan, such an improvement over New
York's prior transportation situation can be viewed as only partial and incomplete
compensation for the economic losses suffered by the city that were never covered by private
insurance - such as the huge loss of tax revenues due to the drop in tourism and business
flight out of the city. Moreover, the rest of that $5.5 billion is designated for "restoration and
reconstruction" of certain highways and local roads "damaged by the September 11th
terrorist attacks," to "rebuild utility infrastructure destroyed as a result of the September
11th terrorist attacks," and to assist Lower Manhattan Development Corporation's efforts to
"rebuild Lower Manhattan." Office of Management and Budget, supra. The rest of the $21
billion includes the costs for the rescue and recovery efforts that immediately followed the
attacks and the massive cleanup costs in the ensuing months, as well as the anticipated
amounts of FEMA and SBA grants and loans. This $21 billion is separate from the $5 billion
allocated to the Victim Compensation Fund, the $8 billion allocated to airline subsidies, the
$35 billion for Homeland Security, and the $30 billion for the "war on terrorism." Id.
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are expected to be larger for 9/11-related lost profits than for any
previous single-day event, amounting to more than twenty-five percent
of all private-insurance payouts related to the 9/1 1 losses.14 Despite
this insurance coverage, however, and despite the presence of federal
grants and loans for some business losses,15 it must be the case that
huge financial losses that can be directly attributed to the attacks will
go uncompensated.16 To be sure, some of these losses are private
rather than social losses because some of these losses are offset by
gains to other businesses located far from

Ground Zero.

This

distinction may matter when it comes to encouraging governments to
take precautions or when structuring optimal insurance policies, but it
seems safe to proceed from the assumption that there were substantial
uninsured

social

losses

associated

with

the

interruption

and

destruction of business caused by the attacks.
In sum, we might think of the 9/11 physical property losses as
having been effectively insured whether through private insurance or
government relief, but regard other property-related financial losses as
having been only partially insured. This summary, and much of the
discussion below, intentionally bends the idea of insurance to include
government relief. Insurance and relief are obviously not the same one may be expected by contract while the other depends on politics
and

circumstances.

But inasmuch as

governments

can

subsidize

insurance or offer insurance without requiring premiums, and because
private parties can come to expect relief in some circumstances, it can
be useful to fold insurance and relief into one package.
B.

Losses to Life

As for loss of life, it is almost certain that a large number of those
killed on 9/1 1 were uninsured or underinsured.17 Although there are
no publicly available data on this issue, the likelihood that many of the
victims had only small life-insurance policies, or none at all, is

14. Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, 9/11 and Insurance, One Year Later
Terror Attacks Most Complex Disaster in History (Sept. 5, 2002),
http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.635680/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
15. 13 C.F.R. § 123.3 (2002), available at www.sba.gov/Iibrary/cfrs/13cfr123.pdf
(explaining disaster loan program for business losses).
16. See Diane Levick & Matthew Lubanko, What Price, Terror?; for Insurers, Stalled
Business Claims Complicate Picture, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 25, 2001, at Dl (estimating
business interruption claims in the range of $15-25 billion, compared to the total estimate of
all 9/11 claims of $40-72 billion); Christian Murray, Adjusting to Disaster Strains Claims
Team; Despite Heartbreak, Some Payouts Must End, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 2001, at A42 (noting
the industry had received $16.6 billion of business interruption claims to date).
17. Jason Bram et al., Measuring the effects ofthe September 11 attack on New York City,
ECON. POL'Y REV. - FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., Nov. 1, 2002, at 6 ("Although private
insurance is expected to cover a portion of these losses, it is not likely that all of the workers
had taken out private life-insurance policies.").
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overwhelming. For one thing, underinvestment in life insurance is a
pervasive

problem.18

Although

many

households

purchase

life

insurance, few purchase enough to maintain their standard of living
should a primary earner die prematurely.19 Moreover, the main
motivation for the large amount of charitable giving, as well as the
Victims' Compensation Fund, discussed below, was the realization
that many of the victims were uninsured or underinsured.20 Still, many
of the deceased did have some life insurance or were covered by
pension benefits payable upon death (or both).21
In
addition,
immediately following
9/11

there

was

an

unprecedented amount of charitable giving aimed at compensating, or
at least assisting, the families of deceased victims.22 The other primary
source of compensation for victims' families is the September 1 1 th
Victims' Compensation Fund, established by Congress shortly after
the disaster.23 Under this unprecedented program, the families of
individuals who suffered physical inj ury or death in the 9/11 attacks
can apply for fairly generous benefits.24 If they elect to do so, however,

18. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB . L. RE V. 1 (2001).
19. Id.
20. Of course, the definition of full or adequate coverage is highly subjective. The
"optimal" amount of life insurance for any given family on the life of an earner depends not
only on the income level of the earner, but also on the expectations with respect to what the
surviving dependents' standard of living should be if the insured earner dies. For example, to
what extent, if at all, will the surviving spouse be expected to work additional hours to make
up for the loss of income? And to what extent will the family's savings be considered a self
insurance reserve of sorts? These are questions that each family must answer for itself.
21. The Special Master of the Fund, Kenneth Feinberg, has published a very small
sample of payout profiles, including the amount of the award, the individual's annual income
and number of dependents, and the collateral offset (which includes life-insurance proceeds).
Although no strong conclusions can be drawn from such a small sample, which was probably
not randomly selectea, it provides support for the idea that at least some of the victims had
significant amounts of life insurance. U.S. DEP 'T OF JUSTICE, CLAIMANT AWARD
SUMMARIES (Dec. 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/award_summaries.pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
22. AM. RED CR OSS , SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: UNPRECEDENTED EVENTS,
UNPRECEDENTED RESPONSE 6 (Sept. 2002) (reporting that the American Red Cross's
Liberty Fund had by September 11, �002 received roughly $1 billion in donations,
approximately $800 million of which was to be distributed by the end of 2002),
http://www.redcross.org/press/disaster/ds_pr/pdfs/arcwhitepaper.pdf (last visited Apr. i2,
2004). Interestingly, according to one news report, the bulk of those funds were designated
for the families of firefighters, police officers, and other rescue workers who perished. Thus,
according to this story, the average charitable award to the families of slain or severely
injured firefighters and rescue workers was just over (and the amount to families of police
officers just under) $1 million. By contrast, the average charitable payout to the families of
other victims was around $146,000. Martin Kasindorf, Big Gaps Found in 9111 Benefits, USA
TODAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at IA. These amounts do not include any amounts received from
insurance policies, pension payments, or the Victims' Compensation Fund.
23. ATSSS Act, supra note 1.
24. See U.S. Department of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims; Award
Payment Statistics tbl.1, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationlpayments_deceased.

275

Terrorism and Crime

November 2003]

the payouts they receive from the Fund must, under the collateral
offset provision of the statute, be reduced dollar for dollar by the
amount of life insurance or other death benefits to which they are
otherwise entitled - though not by the amount of charitable gifts
received.25 As is customary, however, none of these life-insurance
policies or pension-policy death benefits that were in effect contained
clauses requiring the reduction of death benefits in the event of third
party or other insurance payments. The presence of private insurance
therefore reduced or eliminated the payments from the Fund that
might have been made to the families of some victims, and in turn may
have increased the pool of funds (and thus the payments) available to
the families of other victims.
Another unusual aspect of the Fund is the requirement that
claimants forego tort litigation with respect to their losses, at least
insofar

as

the most obvious potential domestic defendants are

concerned.26 Thus, a family cannot accept a payment from the Fund
and then seek to recover from an airline, an employer, an owner or
builder of a collapsed building, engineers who designed the buildings,
and so forth.27 Suits against construction firms or designers of buildings
are of course still possible if brought by claimants who do not collect
from the Fund, or if brought by the City of New York or by businesses
or property owners affected by the attack. Suits against foreign
organizations

and

tortfeasors

are

of

course

possible,

and

are

enthusiastically reported in the news.28
To summarize, the families of individuals who lost their lives in the

9/11

attacks may receive payments from one or more (but not all) of

the following sources: the Victims' Compensation Fund (assuming
they waive their tort rights and, once again, subject to reductions
corresponding to amounts recovered under existing life-insurance
benefits), third-party tort defendants (either because they choose not
to collect from the Fund or because they pursue foreign tortfeasors

html (updated daily) (reporting median award as of Apr. 12, 2004 to be $1,435,349). Note
also the tax relief provided by Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which
curiously extends the tax benefits to those injured in both the Oklahoma City bombing and
the anthrax attacks, but not to the victims of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing.
25. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2003). For a thorough discussion of the collateral-offset
provisions in the Fund, see Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle:
Collateral Sources Under the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 591 (2003).
26. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(3)(B).
27. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61 (2003).
28. See Henry Weinstein, $15 trillion 9111 lawsuit adds Saudi royals as defendants, CHI.
TRJB., Nov. 23, 2002, at 10 (reporting that a fifteen trillion dollar lawsuit now includes 186
defendants).
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relentlessly), charities, and life insurers (under contracts
conventionally contain no collateral-offset provisions).
C.

that

The Effects on the Insurance Industry and the Federal Response

Despite the vast magnitude of the insured life and property losses,
there seems to be little doubt that most life insurers and property
insurers will be able to meet their financial obligations arising out of
the events of 9/1 1 . As for the life-insurance market, the number of
insured deaths was not so great as to threaten instability among
insurers. Nor will the demand for life-insurance policies disappear;
individuals will hardly cease to purchase policies merely because
policy ownership will likely cause a reduction in government relief
following (the very unlikely event of) death as a result of terrorism. To
the contrary, although there are no hard data on this, we suspect that
the events of 9/11 encouraged a short-term run on trusts and estate
lawyers' services and perhaps a temporary surge in the market for life
insurance as well.
The property-insurance market is apparently more easily ruffled.
A few of the less well-capitalized reinsurers may yet become insolvent
as a result of 9/1 1 -related property losses (much as some firms
collapsed

following

Hurricane

Andrew

and

the

Northridge

Earthquake ) ,29 but the overall solvency of the property-casualty

insurance industry is not in doubt.30 The uncertainty is with respect to
the availability of terrorism coverage in the future and, in turn, the
possibility that there will be less building, or less building in some
locations and of certain types of properties, not simply because
insurance premiums rise accurately in response to newly understood
threats, but rather because insurance markets will not adjust smoothly
to the post-9/1 1 world.
Immediately following 9/11 , a number of commentators and
industry officials expressed concerns about an impending "crisis" in
terrorism

insurance.

It

was

widely

reported

that

international

reinsurers were planning to insert broad terrorism exclusions in their
new policies and that these exclusions would be applied as old policies
came up for renewal. Primary insurers would in tum seek permission
from state regulators to insert similar exclusions in their policies. The
ultimate effect, or so the argument went, would be to cause disruptions
in

the

mortgage

lending

and

commercial

real

estate

markets.

Commercial lenders would be reluctant to issue loans - or would

29. Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Aug. 2002, 1995 WL 628905
("Eleven property-casualty insurers became insolvent due to Hurricane Andrew (10 in
Florida and one in Louisiana) and others were financially impaired.").

30. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 3.
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demand compensation in the form of exorbitant interest rates - in the
absence of insurance coverage for terrorism-related losses.
Based on these concerns, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002,31 which, as we will see, is similar to the British
system for dealing with terrorism risks to property.32 Under this new
regime, the federal government will provide reinsurance for ninety
percent

of

all

property-casualty

losses

attributable

to

"acts

of

terrorism" (as determined by the Secretary of Treasury), but only to
the extent that the aggregate losses fall between $10 billion (rising to
$15 billion over three years) and $100 billion.33 By introducing
government

reinsurance,

this

program

radically

alters

the

public/private mix of insurance and compensation for terrorism
related property risks. In effect, it makes the federal government the
terrorism reinsurer of last resort. We discuss the related issues of
whether this type and degree of federal intervention was called for and
what the relevant justifications might be in Part IV below.
Ill. TERRORISM INSURANCE, CHARITABLE GIVING, AND EPISODIC

GOVERNMENT RELIEF
We tum now to the question of what sort of compensation,
insurance, and charitable developments should be expected in the
event of another major loss from terrorism, given recent events. The
question may seem little more than a thought experiment, though
there are safe and interesting predictions to be made. Our analysis
includes a comparison of terrorism-related disasters with natural
disasters and incorporates the interactions among private insurance,
public relief, and charitable giving in the two contexts. One of our
predictions is that, as with natural disasters, public and charitable
relief will more likely be forthcoming if there is (or is perceived to be)
less than full private insurance. In this Part we also explore the
question of why 9/1 1 prompted such unprecedented amounts of relief
- especially in the form of the Victim's Compensation Fund - and
whether future attacks should be expected to do the same. Along the
same lines, we consider the unpleasant possibility that what began as a
series of terrorist attacks might expand into a long-term war, resulting
in political pressure to shift from a system of episodic relief to a more
systematized and permanent compensation regime.

31. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2.
32. See infra Part III.C.2.
33. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 103(e).
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Private- and Public-Insurance Responses to Another Attack

There is every reason to think that, in the event of another attack
on U.S. soil, and especially one aimed at a civilian target, significant
government-provided compensation would again be forthcoming, even
though the attacks experienced before 9/11 did not produce such aid.
One reason for this prediction is the Victims' Compensation Fund
itself and the precedent it now represents. It is conceivable, however,
that the political and emotional underpinnings of the Fund would fail
to reappear if terror-related losses became common. Indeed, it is
something of conventional wisdom to say that the 9/11 attacks were a
historic event of the worst kind, and that the reactions to it should also
be understood as singular. But the case seems to be stronger for the
prediction that the Fund would serve as a kind of precedent for relief
following future attacks, much as the substantial federal appropriation
that followed the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 is thought to have been
the first of what then became a series of relief plans.34 What is
interesting about this example for the present situation is not the
legislative history but the emerging pattern, in which victims of new
disasters point to recent precedents to strengthen their own claims for
government relief.
And this pattern of relief should come as no surprise. Natural
catastrophes attract media attention and political interest, in part
because of the dramatic and vivid stories of woe that they produce. In
addition, there is the effect of geographic concentration; that is,
natural disasters typically hit only a well-defined fraction of the
country and of the economy, creating the quintessential concentrated
and politically effective interest group. In any event, this attention
attracts charitable interest as well as governmental funds, although, as
discussed more fully below, the extent to which the victims will be seen
as sympathetic to mainstream voters, and hence politicians in other
parts of the country, depends importantly on the extent of uninsured
rather than insured losses.35
We would expect a similar dynamic to play out to an even greater
degree if there were to be another terrorist attack or a series of such

34. In the twenty or so years following that earthquake, legislators who sought disaster
relief for their home states readily pointed to the Alaskan example, where there was relief
after a significant but not unprecedented quake. See DOUGLAS C. DACY & HOWARD
KUNREUTHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL DISASTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL
POLICY 54-57 (1969); Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its
Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 , 18-19 (1996).
35. We do not, of course, assume that voters generally are aware of how much property
or life-insurance coverage the average household has. Rather, the idea is that the calls for
relief will be more likely to come from those who do not have other sources of
compensation, and that it will be the pleas (and stories) of the uninsured victims that will get
the most (and most effective) play in the media and with politicians, and then perhaps with
voters.
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attacks. Terrorism, after all, draws in the entire nation in a way that
natural disasters do not. This is because an attack from abroad,
including a pronouncement or history of animus toward the country as
a whole, is seen as one aimed at the integrity or confidence of all
citizens. Thus, j ust as Pearl Harbor was considered an attack on the
entire nation and not just an attack on the state of Hawaii, so too a
terrorist attack on U.S. soil (perhaps especially one carried out by an
attacker who is or is perceived to be a "foreign combatant") would be
considered an attack on the U.S. people and government. A natural
disaster will trigger a weaker
hurricanes do not hit Florida

reaction

because it

than

an

enemy assault;

is a part of the United States,

whereas terrorists struck New York and Washington precisely for
what they signified about our nation.
Indeed,

part

of

what

may

have

motivated

the

Victims'

Compensation Fund was the feeling that the losses suffered on 9/11
were no different from losses caused by the attack of a foreign
sovereign, thus putting them in the category of losses appropriately
addressed by the federal government.36 Political parties, economists,
and citizens may disagree as to the proper scope of the federal
government, but national defense is on everyone's list of governmental
functions, and it is only one additional step to the idea that the federal
government ought to be responsible or generous where losses are
incurred because of a failure of this federal function.37 This leap from
failed protection to generous compensation may be primarily an
emotional reaction rather than a logical progression, but it helps to
explain the comfort with federal relief following 9/1 1 .

36. The Israeli example i s instructive here. When the Israeli Parliament first adopted its
terrorism compensation regime, discussed more fully below, the primary rationale was the
notion that any losses experienced by individuals or particular families as a result of the
terrorist war on the Israeli government and people as a whole should be spread across all of
its citizens. See Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism:
Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335, 336-39 (2003). Of course,
whereas viewing the attack on 9/11 as an "act of war" against the U.S. government and its
people may have increased the willingness of Congress to enact a generous compensation
regime, such an interpretation of events would tend to undermine the argument for private
insurance coverage for those losses, since most insurance policies contain "war-risk"
exclusions. Interestingly, almost immediately following the 9/11 attack, several of the largest
property-casualty insurers publicly stated their intention not to invoke the war-risk
exclusion. This may have been a patriotic gesture, or it may have represented a savvy legal
judgment that, under prevailing case law, the war-risk exclusion would not likely apply in the
9/11 case anyway. See Pan Am. World Airways v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d
Cir. 1974).
37. We do not mean to imply that a government function need always be encouraged
by compensation in the event of failure or even disappointment, because governments
are often disciplined by political checks and other means. But compensation is surely more
easily explained or defended where losses are incurred because of government failure, or at
least where it is the government rather than a private party that might have best prevented
the loss.
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Indeed, it is just this sort of visceral reaction to the 9/1 1 attacks,
together with the inspiring example of the rescue workers running into
the burning towers (and perhaps the suppression of stories about the
misdeeds of a very few rescue workers), that may explain the
extraordinary level of charitable giving both in terms of money and
volunteer efforts, including the extraordinary increase in blood
donations.38 In fact, the only periods in U.S. history of comparable
charitable involvement have been during times of war when American
citizens rallied together to battle a foreign enemy.39
The other major factor that may lead to substantial government
relief for victims of terrorism-related disasters is the predictable
pattern connecting uninsured losses, public sympathy, and government
relief. This link builds on the following fact: public sympathy following
a disaster will almost certainly be more intense, and hence the political
determination to provide relief funds will be greater, to the extent
there are

uninsured

victims. It is, of course, those victims who will

most likely come to the attention of voters through media coverage,
personal or political relationships, and other channels.40 If a disaster
largely creates victims who already have private insurance for their
losses, there is apt to be less sympathy and therefore a lower
probability of public or charitable relief. The idea is that politicians
will respond less readily to pleas for help from those who are known to
have other sources of compensation.41
It is noteworthy that the existing disaster-relief programs always
condition relief on the absence of insurance coverage. For example,
Farm Service Agency and Small Business Administration low-interest
loans to eligible individuals, farmers, and businesses who suffer
damaged

property

is

conditional

on

the

absence

of insurance.

Similarly, FEMA grants to cover certain expenses are conditioned on
an absence of insurance coverage.42
The overall picture comes with something of a cynical gloss; relief
requires a sizeable group of sympathetic beneficiaries who, ideally, are
also politically coordinated or appealing to the media, which increases
the likelihood of a major disaster declaration. If a disaster creates
victims who are insured, however, there is apt to be less sympathy and
therefore a lower probability of monetary relief, because politicians

38. See AM. RED CROSS, supra note 22.
39. Notably, the attack on Pearl Harbor did not give rise to the enactment of a 9/11-type
compensation fund for the victims of that attack. One reason for this might be that there
were relatively few civilian deaths and relatively little damage to non-government property.
40. Levmore, supra note 34, at 18-19.
41. Id. See generally David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal
Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK 307 (Kenneth A.
Frost ed., 1999) (detailing the growth of the federal budget allocations for disaster relief).
42.

44

C.F.R. § 206.110, 206.113 (2003).
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who are considering special appropriations will respond more readily
to

pleas

for

help

from

those

who

have

no

other

source

of

compensation. Given this relationship between uninsured losses and
the likelihood of government relief, an incentive is created among
individuals and businesses

not

to purchase insurance (or to purchase

less-than-full insurance) against disaster losses.43 A final implication is
that this dynamic at the margins may affect "real" - and not merely
insurance - decisions. For example, the expectation of federal relief
has almost certainly increased the willingness of some individuals and
businesses to locate or remain in disaster prone areas. This sort of
moral hazard actually increases the risk of the hazards being insured
against.
It is possible that there will be a similar perverse interaction
between government relief and charitable giving for future terror
victims. For example, having observed the magnitude of charitable
giving following 9/1 1 , government officials may be inclined to be less
generous in the event of a future attack. It may be that the memory of
the remarkable outpouring of charity for the victims of 9/11 will
dampen the federal government's willingness to appropriate large
amounts of relief aid for victims if and when the next terrorism-related
disaster occurs. Alternatively, rather than reducing relief payments,
Congress might, in a future version of the Victim Compensation Fund,
explicitly include charitable contributions on the list of collateral
sources to be offset against any relief award.
Of course , the effect may run in the opposite direction as well.
Having seen how generous the federal government can be when there
is an extraordinary foreign-based attack on American soil, potential
donors may reduce their contributions in future cases, relying on the
government to do the job once again. And if contributions were to
diminish (or were expected to diminish) in this way, there would be
even more political pressure for the government to provide relief.
Similarly, one might imagine that charities would then focus their
attention on victims whose losses went uncompensated by government
relief or private insurance; charities could in this way fill in the

43. Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief of Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
167 (1991) (modeling how government insurance for various risks, including disaster risks,
distorts individual incentives). Note that, because government disaster relief is dispersed
only in the event of a declared "major disaster," private insurance is, from the insured's point
of view, a better buy for small-scale than for large-scale disasters. More precisely, an
insurance purchaser should be willing to pay more for insurance against a given expected
loss that is not likely to be covered by government relief (for example, a loss associated with a
small-scale disaster) than she would pay for the same expected loss that is expected to be
reimbursed, at least partially, by the government. This conclusion assumes that insurance
companies would not lower their price-per-unit of insurance to take account of likely large
scale disaster coverage. If they could - and they would in a perfectly competitive market then both the coverage for the small-scale and the coverage for the large-scale disasters
would be priced at actuarially fair rates.
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coverage gaps and also signal where future government relief might be
directed. How all of these interacting influences will ultimately play
out remains to be seen.
Another factor that might lead to a reduction in both government
benefits and charitable relief following future terrorism disasters is the
perception that, for all the recollections and evidence of tragedy and
heroism, a significant number of affected families emerged with more
wealth than before the attacks - and stories of outright fraud will also
continue to appear. If such stories remain salient, one can easily
imagine that congressional policymakers and potential donors would
be reluctant to replicate the unprecedented generosity following 9/1 1 .
W e have already emphasized the importance o f the extent of
uninsurance or underinsurance as related to the amount of likely
government relief. Given this relationship, one might reasonably ask
how significant the underinsurance problem will be in the future for
terrorism-related risks. As to life insurance, it seems highly unlikely
that even the unprecedented generosity of the 9/11 Fund's payouts will
affect future life-insurance-purchasing decisions. With respect to
property insurance, questions of insurability and underinsurance are
more complex. We take up these questions in Part IV below and find
both that the uninsurability problem has been exaggerated, and that
the new federal property-casualty reinsurance program may not be
terribly effective. In particular, when individuals and businesses can
decline the new terrorism coverage, as they can under the new law, the
program may actually end up contributing to the underinsurance
followed-by-relief cycle. In any case, in the event of a future attack,
there will likely be room for a federal-program response similar to the
response engendered by the attacks on 9/1 1 . A somewhat different
question is raised by the prospect of a protracted war against civilian
targets, rather than another isolated terrorist attack, and we take up
this question in Part 111.C below.
B.

What Made 9111 Different from Previous Terror Attacks?

A related but distinct comparative question is why the 9/11 attacks
triggered so much more government relief than did previous terrorist
attacks. Put differently, once compensation for terror-related losses
was placed on the table, why was the program not expanded to include
benefits to victims of the earlier World Trade Center bombing, the
Oklahoma City bombing, or the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, which
killed a number of U.S. sailors?
Part of the answer lies in a simple reference to scale. Many more
people died on 9/1 1 than in any of the previous terrorist attacks. The
earlier attacks also affected fewer uninsured parties. In the case of 9/1 1
there was a huge loss of uninsured life, not because of terrorism
exclusions, but because of simple underinsurance problems resulting
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from myopia, overoptimism, bad planning, or passivity on the part of
persons who are unlikely to purchase insurance coverage above what
is provided through their employment contracts. Given what we know
about patterns of life-insurance purchasing generally, approximately
three thousand sudden deaths would almost certainly generate a
significant number of uninsured or underinsured lives. Moreover,
given that some lower-income households may view life insurance as a
luxury, it is likely that the underinsurance problem may even be worse
among the relatively low-income workers who worked at the World
Trade Center.44
At the same time, the amount of uninsured and underinsured
damage to New York's infrastructure and businesses created
immediate

and

overwhelming

(and

probably

desirable)

political

pressure on the President and Congress to commit federal funds to
rebuild and reinvigorate the city, which in turn may have had an effect
on victim relief initiatives. Put directly, it might have been politically
difficult to transfer large amounts of money for property damage or
other economic losses without also doing much for the families of
those who were killed in the attack. In contrast, the families of the
sailors killed on the U.S.S. Cole received some payments from the
government as a matter of course, because all members of the armed
forces are covered by modest death benefits.45 Moreover, in the case of
the U.S.S. Cole, there was no need to assemble a political coalition to
legislate a strategy for replacing the lost property. Inasmuch as such a
repair is obviously a better investment than is the abandonment of the
ship, the vessel was probably repaired either with funds found in the
ordinary

budget

for

naval

operations

or

through

a

special

appropriation. Somewhat similarly, in the Oklahoma City case, there
was no large-scale damage to state and local infrastructure, but rather
the destruction of a building owned by the federal government itself. It
is likely that the lives lost in that tragedy included few who were both
uninsured, or dramatically underinsured, and in position to support a
family.46
44. The countervailing effect, however, would be that the normal, government-provided
life insurance - paid out through the Social Security Survivorship program to dependents of
qualifying workers - would provide a higher percentage income replacement for low
income than for high-income recipients.

45. Currently the government will pay a "death gratuity" to the surviving heirs of
military personnel killed on active or inactive duty. See 10 U.S.C. § 1475, 1478 (2000).
Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 1335. Most military
personnel also participate in the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance program ("SGLI"),
which provides $250,000 of coverage. The premiums are automatically deducted from the
servicemember's pay, unless they elect for a lower amount of coverage. See Armed Forces
Services Corporation, Servicemember's Group Life Insurance Benefits, at http:l/www.afsc
usa.com/sgli.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
46. Many of those killed in the Oklahoma City bombing were federal employees who
participated in the Federal Employee Group Life Insurance Program. Basic coverage is at
least $10,000 and most employees are automatically enrolled. Optional coverage is available
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The 9/1 1 attacks did great harm to a workplace that naturally had
many breadwinners who

in

turn left families that claimed

our

sympathy. Oklahoma City took the lives of fewer heads of households;
the death of children upsets us as much as anything, but it does not
produce circumstances that seem much improved by the appropriation
of money. In short, it is unsurprising that Oklahoma City families
eventually

received but

modest

tax relief, while the

9/11

Fund

provided quite substantial direct payments.
Although these distinctions can help us to predict when and where
after-the-fact government relief will be forthcoming, they do not solve
the puzzle entirely. Had the political picture been slightly different,
the 9/11 Fund might have been expanded to include families affected
by

the

earlier

terrorist

attacks,

with

the

same

collateral-offset

provisions to limit the coverage to uninsured losses only. In this way,
the relief would have flowed mostly to sympathetic, uninsured, or
underinsured families. Indeed, it is possible that this sort of retroactive
expansion may yet occur in the event of another attack, but it is
doubtful, if only because of the obvious line-drawing problems. If the
benefits were expanded to include the families of the victims of the
World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, it seems difficult
to j ustify excluding the U.S.S. Cole victims and then the victims of the
contemporaneous anthrax attacks and so on. Of course, difficulty in
drawing lines is not the same as impossibility; nevertheless, it might be
thought easiest and safest for the federal budget simply to draw a
bright line between pre- and post-9/1 1 events, so that future terrorist
attacks might be treated along the lines of the 9/11 model with no new
relief for losses caused before that infamous day.
Again, we do not mean to insist that one can examine tragedies as
they occur and always predict the character and magnitude of
subsequent relief. If the 9/11 relief package had required a few more
votes in Congress, for example, or a political appeal to the hinterland,
one can easily imagine the last-minute inclusion of the families of
victims of the Oklahoma City blast. A politician might then have
emphasized the expense of constructing a new federal building in
Oklahoma City, and while legislating funds for that reconstruction or
for a memorial to be built on the site of that blast, it might have
seemed unfeeling to provide nothing for lost lives.47 In the event of

up to five times the employee's annual salary. See Office of Personnel Management, Federal
Employees' Group Life Insurance Program, at http://www.opm.gov/insure/life/FAQs/FAQs
l.htm (last updated March 13, 2003). Victims also received modest compensation from the
Murrah Crime Victims Compensation Fund. The original ambitions of this fund never
materialized, however, and its benefits were limited to $10,000. See Gary Fields, Oklahoma
City Aid not Reaching Victims, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1995, at 3A.
47. One argument for including victims of the first World Trade Center bombing might
have emphasized the similarity of the attackers' origins and motivations with those behind
the 9/11 attacks.
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another tragedy, and assuming as we are now that such a tragedy
would give rise to ex post relief in accordance with the 9/11 model,
there would likely be attempts of j ust this sort to include the families
of victims of past terrorist attacks and perhaps the victims of wars and
wrongs experienced long ago. Indeed, it is noteworthy that although
Oklahoma City victims were not included in the 9/11 package, they
were eventually provided with modest assistance in the Victims of
Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 .48

These

attempts to

equate

tragedies, in the sense of using one disaster or relief effort as
precedent for another, may succeed - but they may also unwittingly
bring about the collapse of political coalitions and hence of relief along
the lines of the 9/1 1 Fund. For example, if the next terror attack in the
United

States

were

to

provoke

calls

for

9/11-like

levels

of

compensation, the coalition of political forces that supported the 9/11
Fund as a one-time occurrence may, owing to the prospect of excessive
cost, fail to reconstitute.
In any event, we maintain our basic claim that a future large-scale
terrorist event will almost certainly generate ex post relief of the sort
that followed 9/1 1. A further prediction is that the precise shape of the
episodic relief will, as always, hinge on the pattern of insured and
uninsured losses.
There is an alternative explanation for the generous compensation
regime that followed 9/11 that deserves as much consideration as one
that emphasizes uninsured losses. Recall that beneficiaries who file for
benefits under the Fund must waive most of their rights to sue in tort.49
The primary and intended beneficiary of that provision is almost
certainly the airline industry.50 The airline industry was, for obvious
reasons, among the hardest hit by the events of 9/1 1. Demand for
tickets dropped, there was an immediate spike in airline insurance
premiums, and, by some reports, the available insurance policies
removed coverage for losses caused by terrorism.

Congressional

reactions to this state of affairs, and to the fear of airline bankruptcies

48. Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 3920: TAX RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3920.pdf (summarizing tax benefits made available to victims
of 9/11, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 2001 anthrax attacks). Under this provision,
the qualifying survivors of those attacks are exempt from income tax for the year of attack
and the previous year, with the minimum refund being set at $10,000. Thus, even those who
owed no income taxes in a given tax year will be considered to have paid $10,000 in income
tax in that year, and will receive a $10,000 federal tax refund check. See id. at 5. Interestingly,
these tax relief checks will not be treated as a "collateral offset" under the 9/11 Victim
Compensation Fund. See ATSSS Act, supra note 1; 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2003).
49. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
50. Raymond L. Mariani, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and
the Protection of the Airline Jndustry: A Bill for the American People, 67 J. AIR L. & COM.
141 (2002); Lizette Alvarez, A Nation Challenged: The Bailout; An Airline Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at Al.
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and economic disaster, included the Air Transportation Safety and
System

Stabilization

Act's

provision

of cash

transfers,s1

loans,s2

insurance subsidies,s3 and safeguards from litigation to the airline
industry.s4 Given the generosity of the benefits available to the families
of victims through the 9/11 Fund, and the requirement that recipients
waive the right to litigate, this waiver requirement provides great value
to the airlines.ss This is not the place to explore the question of
whether under the principles of our tort system the airlines ought to
have feared the legal aftermath of 9/1 1 . A respectable argument can
be made that in the absence of obvious negligence and in the presence
of other potential defendants who could have been linked to the 9/11
losses under some theory of negligence or strict liability (focusing on
the failure to reinforce cockpit doors or to design buildings in a
different manner, for example), the only thing to fear was the
inclination of some juries to move money to sympathetic victims. But
it is possible that the waiver idea was critical to post-9/1 1 relief and
that this disaster is different from most others.s6 And to the extent that
the 9/1 1 Fund is therefore seen as nothing more than such an industry
specific and episodic subsidization scheme - accompanied by
compensation for victims' families in order to maintain appearances
perhaps - there is not much to say about future relief. Industry
bailouts are episodic in their own way and in any event do not suggest
a move toward routinized relief.
C.

From Episodic Relief to Permanent (Routinized) Compensation

The discussion of public and private responses to future terrorist
attacks has assumed to this point that future attacks would be rare,
even if devastating. If, however, the 9/11 attacks prove to be the
beginning of a protracted conflict involving numerous events that
produce

losses

of

life

and

property

on

American

soil,

then

expectations would likely change. Calls for generous episodic relief on

51. ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 101(a)(2) (calling for payments of up to $5 billion for
losses due to ground top order following attacks of 9/11 ).
52. Id. § lOl(a)(l) (authorizing up to $10 billion in loans).
53. Id. § 201(b) (authorizing temporary subsidies for increased cost of airlines-insurance
coverage).
54. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
55. The other protection for the air transportation industry in the Act was a provision
limiting the airlines' tort damages arising out of 9/11 to the amount of liability insurance in
force at the time of the attacks. See ATSSS Act, supra note 1, § 408.
56. Although one can, with respect to Oklahoma City and the earlier World Trade
Center bombing, begin to imagine potential tort defendants, none of those defendants can
make as plausible a case as could the airline industry post-9/11 that an entire and critical
industry was in jeopardy - at least in the sense of being threatened with enormous
transaction costs as firms reorganized or closed and new owners of old aircraft emerged.
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the order of the 9/11 Fund payouts might help to fuel a preemptive
political move to adopt a more permanent regime of compensation,
though with more modest benefit levels. Another potential political
justification for such a regime would be the idea of boosting public
morale by establishing a framework in which all citizens and taxpayers
must share somewhat in the burdens of war. In addition, such a regime
might be considered a valid response to the failure of (or gaps in) the
private-insurance market. Although private insurers may be able to
function amidst a full-scale war - that is, they may be able to cover
war-related risks in return for high premiums - a society that is
involved in a full-scale war is likely to find itself with numerous
insolvent insurers, and then with customers who are unwilling to rely
on private insurance because of the risk of insurer insolvency.57
Thus, if it becomes clear that a long-term war is at hand, involving
a substantial risk of recurring strikes on the U.S. mainland, substantial
government involvement in providing terrorism compensation directly
to victims seems likely. In this Part, we discuss this possibility, and we
draw lessons from the examples of Britain and Israel.
1.

To What Extent Is the Current U. S. ReliefRegime "Permanent"?
As a preliminary matter, we should note that there already exists a

permanent federal program

that

provides

some relief from the

economic losses caused by any disaster the President declares a "major
disaster," including terrorism-related disasters. That relief comes in
the form of loans and grants following property damage, both private
and public;58 but these funds are available only after the governor of
the state in which the disaster has occurred makes the required
disaster

declaration

and

the

President

follows

with

a

similar

declaration. In an important sense, then, the existing regime of
government compensation for disaster-caused losses to property is
largely ad hoc or episodic, except to the extent that these disaster
declarations are largely predictable.59 With respect to terrorism-related
losses specifically, there are some existing federal programs (enacted

57. At that point, of course, an unassisted market might respond through a consortium
of insurers. This solution, however, would likely prompt some government involvement, as
regulatory constraints on monopolization would need to be relaxed (to allow for the
increased risk sharing among insurers) and greater oversight of premiums exercised.
58. See supra note 9.
59. The exception to this pattern is flood insurance. Under the National Flood Insurance
Program ("NFIP"), there are predetermined floodplain areas in which property owners are
eligible to purchase federally subsidized flood insurance. Thus, once such coverage is
purchased, there need be no disaster declaration for property owners to be able to recover
on their policies. If, however, the property owner in a floodplain area fails to purchase flood
coverage, or underinsures, and wishes to receive a FEMA grant or SBA loan, the disaster
declaration is necessary and relief is episodic. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82 for
further discussion of the NFIP.
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well before 9/1 1), that provide modest compensation for victims of
terrorist attacks. For example, following the Iranian hostage episode
and a number of other terrorist attacks in the 1 980s, Congress created
a regime that pays a small amount of compensation to certain victims
of terrorism.60 Under this program, citizens who are held hostage by
terrorists receive a stipend of fifty dollars for each day that they are
held in captivity,61 and there is a small death benefit paid to the
families of victims who are killed by terrorists.62
2.

When Terrorism Turns to War: Lessons from England and Israel

It is fairly easy to imagine that repeated attacks or a prolonged war
on U.S. soil would create enormous political pressure to expand the
rather paltry terror-compensation benefits described in the previous
Part. A transition of this sort occurred in both Great Britain and
Israel,

although the resulting programs in those countries differ

significantly from each other.
In B ritain during the Second World War, Churchill famously set
forth the notion that the British people should share in the economic
hardships

imposed by the war.

Incessant bombings, targeted at

civilians and urban centers, threatened to demoralize the country, and
part of the idea behind Churchill's message was to reflect the
conviction that the entire nation was joined in the struggle as one.63 Of
course, no system could fully equalize the burdens of war, and no
attempt was made to impose equal sacrifice following deaths in a
family, whether on the battlefield or in London. But the law that was
passed, The War Damage Act of 1943, did provide compensation for
war damages to property that occurred between September 3, 1939
and October 1, 1964.64 Though the "risk period" during which the Act

60. This regime is primarily the result of two different Acts of Congress: The Hostage
Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-449, 94 Stat. 1967 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5561 note
(2000)), and The Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 801-05, 100
Stat. 879 (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 5569 note (2000)).
61. 5 u.s.c. § 5569(d)(l).
62 5 U.S.C. § 5569(f)(l)(c). These modest benefits are paid only to individuals
employed by or similarly related to the U.S. government. Kimberly A. Trotter,
Compensating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Framework in the United States, 22 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 383, 392 (1987); see also Deborah M. Mostaghel, Wrong Place, Wrong Time,
Unfair Treatment? Aid to Victims of Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83, 90-94 (2001).
63. Winston Churchill determined "that it was 'unfair for British society to place the
entire burden of the destruction on those unlucky enough to be hit.' " See Sommer, supra
note 36, at 338 (quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 888 n.3 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2000), affd, 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001)).
64. War Damage Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 21 (Eng.). Half of the funds for this Act
came from a new tax on landowners and the other half came from general welfare funds. Id.
An earlier piece of similar legislation is the War Risk Insurance Act of 1939, which
authorized the Board of Trade to "undertake the insurance of ships and other goods" and to
"requir[e] persons to insure goods against certain risks in time of war." S.M. KRUSIN & P.H.

was to apply ended in
entirety in
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1981.65

1964,

the Act was eventually repealed in its

Following this repeal, the only remaining provision

of government property insurance was the "Pool Re" scheme, which
we discuss below in connection with the new U.S. terrorism-risk
insurance program.66
Personal injuries were

also

included under

the British war

insurance regime. The Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act
of

1939

made

"provisions

as

respects

certain personal injuries

sustained during the period of the present emergency."67 This scheme
was not limited exclusively to military personnel, but rather applied to
all "gainfully occupied persons . . . and [to] persons of such other
classes as may be specified in the scheme."68 The program still remains
in force and is maintained by the Secretary of State under the Personal
Injuries (Civilians) Scheme

1983.69

A full-scale war on the U.S. mainland, comparable to the situation
in Britain during World War II, is almost impossible to imagine given
the current state of world affairs. More imaginable would be a series of
coordinated terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and against U.S. interests and
citizens

around

the

world.

The

obvious

analogue

to

such

a

hypothetical is the state of war in present-day Israel, and indeed that
country has adopted a permanent terrorism compensation regime that
seems relevant for our purposes.
Israeli law provides a system of direct compensation by the
government for civilian losses of life and limb, and for losses of

THOROLD ROGERS, THE SOLICITORS' HANDBOOK OF WAR LEGISLATION 296 (1940). For
examples of specific compulsory insurance orders, see the second volume in this series. 2 id.
at 417, 972-3 (1942). The War Damage Act of 1941 set up the War Damage Commission to
oversee the "making of payments in respect of war damage." Id. at 975. The Commission
issued a series of ordinances that made participation in this insurance scheme mandatory,
but, as the war grew, the act became increasingly complex. Eventually, the War Damage Act
of 1943 consolidated the various rules of the Commission, but maintained the ordinances
promulgated under the earlier War Risk Insurance Act. 5 MAURICE SHARE & S.M. KRUSIN,
THE SOLICITORS' HANDBOOK OF WAR LEGISLATION 321 (1944). Section l(l)(b) of the new
Act required "contributions by persons interested in land towards the expense of making
such payments." Id. at 321, 377 (detailing the various levels of compulsory insurance
required from different industries).
65. Statute Law (Repeals) Act of 1981 (Eng.).
66. See infra Part IV.B.
67. The "period of the present emergency" extended to March 9, 1946. Personal Injuries
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, 2 � 3 Geo. 6, c. 82 (Eng.).
68. Id.
69. Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme, (1983) SI 1983/686 (Eng.), amended by
Personal Injuries (Civilians) Scheme, (2002) SI 2002/672 (Eng.). The payment amounts are
modest compared to the Victims' Compensation Fund, amounting at most to a few hundred
pounds a week, depending on one's degree of disability. The base compensation to a widow
or widower is ninety-two pounds a week. Despite the fact that the rate schedule is updated
annually, the amounts have changed little, if at all, since 1983. Id. at 2108 sched.2.
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property due to terrorist attacks.70 The level of compensation is
middling, much lower than that provided by the

9/11

fund but much

more than that expected from charitable collections or from the
U.S. legislation that followed the Iranian hostage crisis. Medical care
is provided, and lost earnings are partially replaced up to a middle
class standard.71 We might think of the Israeli system for compensa
ting terrorism losses as comparable to the worker's compensation
program found in the United States, but of course this program does
not presently extend its benefits from the place of work to the place
of war.72
The Israeli regime grew out of a wartime scheme that sought to
spread the burdens of war across the population. The idea behind the
expansion of the war-loss compensation regime was that terrorist
attacks were essentially an extension of the wars that Israel had been
fighting, and, just as acts of war were directed at Israel as a country (so
that the rhetoric or politics of burden-sharing was found attractive),
acts of terrorism were also directed at the Israeli people as a whole.73
American history and politics do not much resemble Israel's, but
terrorist attacks, and recent anthrax and sniper attacks, have affected
the nation as a whole, whereas most other crimes have not. It is not at
all difficult to imagine that more attacks on U.S. soil, perhaps
producing salient uninsured losses, would create the will or political
opportunity to think of the nation as involved in a protracted war, or
to expand our scheme for compensating members (and families of
members) of the armed services to include all victims of terrorism.74
The details of this sort of scheme, and the relative generosity of these
imagined routinized benefits would depend, no doubt, on the mood

70. Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970, 24 LS.I. 131, (1969-70) (providing
compensation for bodily injury suffered in terrorist attacks as well as compensation for
families of deceased victims); Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law, 1961, 15 LS.I.
101, (1960-61) (providing compensation for property damage caused by terrorism).
71. The only English source we have been able to find describing the benefits available
under the Israeli compensation regime is the article by Hillel Sommer. Our very brief
summary of these benefits derives entirely from that article. See Sommer, supra note 36, at
343-51 nn.41-100 and accompanying text. Sommer states that his description of the program
was compiled "from a variety of formal and mostly informal sources." Id. at 343 n.41.
72. Id. at 343-51 nn.41-100 and accompanying text. The Israeli payouts for personal
injury or death are generous compared to other types of social welfare benefits in Israel
(and, certainly, in the United States), but substantially smaller than the benefits offered
under the 9/11 Victims' Compensation Fund. Injured victims receive state-provided medical
care, disability benefits during the period of treatment and recovery, and additional amounts
designed to assist their reentry into the workplace. The families of victims killed by terrorist
attacks receive monthly survivorship benefits (based on the salary of a mid-level government
employee) as well as payments for some incidental expenses. With respect to property losses,
the Israeli government essentially acts as an insurance company, paying to replace or repair
property damaged or destroyed in a terrorist attack. Id.
73. Id. at 353-54.
74. See supra note 45 (reviewing the military compensation scheme).
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created by the final precipitating events, on the level of social
insurance that is otherwise available,75 and on the question of whether
these routinized benefits are cast as a substitute for, or a supplement
to, episodic ex post relief.

3.

Expanding Routinized Terrorism Compensation in the U.S.

If a regime of permanent, routinized terrorism relief were adopted
in the U.S. (and here we focus on compensation for loss of

life) ,

we

would expect such relief to provide only for uncompensated or
uninsured losses.76 This structural spine of any relief system - the
limitation of benefits to uninsured losses - is what sustains public
sympathy for the relief effort, even as it serves the function of reducing
moral hazard. The pervasiveness of this principle can be seen not only
in the collateral-offset provisions of the 9/11 Fund and in the
uncompensated-loss requirements of federal disaster relief programs
more generally, as discussed above, but also in such legal doctrines as
the insurable interest requirement and the principle of indemnity in
insurance law.77
There is, therefore, reason to expect that the adoption of a
permanent regime of terrorism compensation would reduce, though
not eliminate, episodic relief payouts of the sort seen in the

9/1 1

Fund.

Once such a regime is known to be in place, there would be relatively
little political pressure for after-the-fact relief. The same argument
extends to private contributions as well. If citizens knew that some
level of compensation would be paid to families of terror attacks,
charitable giving would likely decrease. There are other examples of
this phenomenon in the private sector. For example, when an
individual within a workplace experiences a sudden family crisis or
unusual emergency, coworkers may contribute money to a fund to
help the person through the difficult period. But such informal ex post
mutual-insurance arrangements are rare with respect to illnesses or
deaths that are known to be covered by insurance that is provided

75. In the United States, of course, we have a variety of domestic social insurance and
employment schemes to use for comparison, and other countries have compensation systems
that are more directly comparable.
76. See infra Part IV.B., where we discuss the government's routinized response to
terrorism-related property losses.
77. This point is emphasized in Abraham & Logue, supra note 25. The principle of
indemnity says that an insurance policyholder should never receive more than full
compensation for a given insured loss. One example of this principle is the doctrine of
insurable interest, which holds that an insurance policy is valid only to the extent the insured
will suffer a loss if the property (or person) insured is destroyed or harmed. ROBERT H.
JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 295 (3d ed. 2002). The principle of indemnity
in general, and the doctrine of insurable interest in particular, are intended to combat moral
hazard.
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through the workplace.78 Similarly, politicians do not sponsor or obtain
government payouts for the families of military personnel killed in
battle, as these families are known to receive death benefits, albeit
modest ones.
It is unlikely, however, that the adoption of a routinized terror
compensation system would bring ex post episodic relief to an end, in
part because it is impossible to predict the scale of a disaster. Thus,
even if a routinized regime were in place, another major terrorism
related

disaster

could

produce

enough

uninsured

losses,

public

sympathy, and interest group influences to bring about yet another ad
hoc response.

An example of this dynamic can be seen in the

application of the National Flood Insurance Program ["NFIP"] .79 The
NFIP is a routinized regime of sorts, funded in part by American tax
dollars and in part through premiums paid by the insureds, and
administered by private-insurance companies.80 Under this program,
the U.S. government in effect subsidizes the ex ante purchase of flood
insurance by those who live in floodplains.81 Thus, when a flood
occurs, there is a permanent and routinized regime in place that
provides scheduled compensation without regard to the level of
sympathy generated by a particular flood. Nevertheless, serious floods
inevitably create losses that are uncovered by this insurance as many
floodplain property owners still do not buy flood coverage, and the
ensuing public sympathy creates pressure to provide additional ex post
relief. Indeed, once there is enough of a public outcry to produce a
declaration of a disaster, the relief to uninsured losses automatically
begins to flow via FEMA and related programs.82

78. Somewhat similarly but tangentially, in a workplace with an employee pension fund,
it is less likely that a retirement is accompanied by a voluntary and sizeable monetary
payment from the employer or from fellow employees. Substantial voluntary payments to
retiring employees became a thing of the past once formal and planned retirement plans
came into being.
79. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 note (2000)); The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975 (1973) (codified at various sections in 42 U.S.C).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4015, 4016, 4017 (2000) (providing for creation of National Flood
Insurance Fund for compensating qualified flood losses and funded via premiums, bond
issuances, and congressional appropriations).
81. See also Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING
THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 125 (1998). See generally Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Introduction to
the National Flood Insurance Program, at http://www.fema.gov/nfip/intnfip.shtm (last
updated Jan. 13, 2004). Although flood insurance is marketed through private-insurance
companies, it is underwritten by the federal government and funded out of general tax
revenues.
82. Flood victims in designated floodplains are supposed to get only one free bite at the
ex post disaster relief apple. That is, if an individual applies for flood-disaster relief and then
does not purchase and maintain flood insurance thereafter, that person is by law supposed to
be barred from receiving any future flood-disaster relief. Thus, with a homeowner who fails
to purchase flood insurance initially, then receives flood-disaster relief when a major flood
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Still, the presence of the in-place compensation regime would
likely reduce the size and extent of any such relief; after all, many

do

buy flood insurance. Therefore, the combined outcome may be an
overall reduction of total payouts to victims.83 That possibility
increases the political attractiveness of such a regime, if we can assume
that

voters

are

sufficiently

well

informed

and

sophisticated

to

appreciate the way in which it might deflect the sympathy factor and
thereby avoid add-on compensation.84
If the class of taxpayers/voters and the class of potential terror
victims are overlapping but not identical groups, perhaps because
some regions but not others are thought to be primary terrorist
targets, the rational actor and political pictures just described become
fuzzier. Those who live in high-risk areas might prefer to rely on
episodic relief, as they count on ex post sympathy to maximize their
recoveries. The majority of citizens might oppose this plan, but they
are too poorly organized to precommit the country to a system with no
ex

post

episodic relief, though

they may

be

able

to

organize

sufficiently to push for routinized relief - with the expectation that
episodic relief will be rare once the basic relief package is in place. At
the same time, even citizens in high-risk areas will recognize that
moderate attacks may not yield ex post relief. The victims of the first
World Trade Center bombing may yet get some compensation for
their losses, but they have gone many years with no relief. These
victims or families may turn out to be worse off than they would have
been with a regime of permanent compensation. But if they come to
be included in a relief package, or had they been included in the 9/1 1
Fund as they almost were, they will be better off. In sum, citizens as a
whole may favor routinized relief; some because the overall payouts
will be lower once sympathy can be reduced, and others because they

occurs, and at that point fails again to buy flood insurance, the bar from receiving relief is
implicated. 42 U.S.C. § 5154(a); see also FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MANDATORY
PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 4 (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/mandpurl.pdf [hereinafter FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE
GUIDELINES]; Pasterick, supra note 81, at 153. Although there is no data on this question,
we would predict that public sympathy and interest-group pressure would make enforcement
of that restriction very difficult. And, of course, to the extent that flood insurance does not
cover the full extent of the flood losses, such relief will likely be forthcoming.
83. The other potential benefit of moving from a system of purely episodic relief to a
system of permanent routinized compensation (or, more likely, to a blended system) is that if
legislation is drafted with no specific victims in view, it is possible that precautions against
fraud and other problems are easier to set in place.
84. Of course, the sympathy factor might also be deflected in other ways. If more
victims, for instance, were fully insured through private markets, this would eliminate or
reduce the need for a compensation regime in the first place. Thus, an alternative to
routinized direct compensation might be government subsidies for insurance purchases, see
infra Part IV, although even that approach seems unlikely to eliminate the possibility of
some level of ex post relief, as some uninsureds will always remain.
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order to ensure coverage in the event of

m

unspectacular losses.
Long delays can also contribute to the uncertainty of relief.
Consider the

episodic relief that

eventually came to Japanese

Americans who were interned during World War IL These reparative
payments came only after many years and only when the class of
surviving and sympathetic internees was on the verge of disappearance
because of natural deaths. The precipitating cause seemed to be the
age

of these

survivors

or

the geographical loyalty

or

political

inclinations of the sitting President rather than the spread of news
about the suffering of this class.85 Moreover, other tragedies and
wrongs have yielded no relief. In short, generous ex-post sympathy
enhanced benefits may come at the price of substantial uncertainty
and even delay. At some point the delay makes the payments symbolic
and

political,

rather

than

compensatory

or influential,

because

expected charges are too far off to influence the behavior of any
political or other actor.
Much of this will seem familiar to readers who have thought about
relief and reparative programs, and so it may be useful to stress that a
remarkable thing about the

9/1 1

Fund is that it offers generous

payouts even though most of the persons who were killed could have
been expected to carry life insurance, payable even for deaths caused
by terrorism. We have already suggested that the destruction of so
much uninsured or underinsured property, along with the desire to
insulate the airline industry from lawsuit, are the real keys to
understanding the development and scope of the

9/11

Fund. The

modest life insurance that most firefighters carry may also have
contributed to the sympathy, the charity, and thereby to the Fund,
though of course we do not find similar relief following the death of
one or several firefighters in the line of duty. The point is that it might
have been politically impossible to establish a Fund that covered
property - including such property as New York City's infrastructure
- and not persons.
In any event, if a routinized regime of terror compensation were
adopted, it is almost certain that the benefits would have to be
significantly reduced. The level of payouts expected from the Fund averaging approximately

$1.9

million per claimant after collateral

offsets86 - could not be sustained in a long-term conflict involving
many such attacks. In a sense, then, the creation of such a Fund, and
the unprecedented generosity of the payouts, reflect an optimistic

85. Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657,
1687-90 (1999).
86. U.S. Department of Justice, Compensation for Deceased Victims; Award Payment
Statistics (Dec. 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments_deceased.html
(last visited May 5, 2004). The median award, as of May 5, 2004, is $1.47 million.
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assumption that business will go on as usual. If attacks became more
regular, however, and the move to a routinized regime were to occur,
fiscal responsibility would require that benefit levels be set lower perhaps something closer to the minimally compensatory levels of
either the Israeli model or something approaching what the families of
American soldiers receive. Sadly, this change might in turn send a
pessimistic and alarming signal to an already rattled citizenry, as the
reduction in benefits would represent a modest sort of defeat.
All of this is not to say, however, that it would have been politically
wiser to structure the 9/11 Fund as a permanent regime from the
beginning. That approach would have made it more difficult to secure
the

funds

for

New

York's

rebuilding

effort

and

would

have

immediately raised the vexing question of whether to include only
attacks on American soil and/or attacks on American citizens. In
addition, it would have raised the issue of retroactivity in a more
serious way. That is, with the admission that a comprehensive,
permanent terror compensation regime was necessary, it would have
been much more difficult to draw a clear line between pre-9/11 and
post-9/11 terror attacks. Relief for a given flood or earthquake does
not necessarily bring with it serious pressure to return to earlier,
perhaps

smaller disasters in

order

to

treat victims with

equal

generosity and sympathy. Once a set of events are linked to a common
enemy in what is s·e en as a single conflict, however, it is unlikely that
relief can be kept episodic.
What is more, these and related questions would have distracted
from the more important tasks at hand following the attacks. If these
matters - the questions concerning the proper amount of benefits and
who should be entitled to receive them - must be confronted in the
future, it will be during a period of dramatic national mobilization, at a
time when interest groups, politicians, and civil libertarians, who all
sometimes make too much of these somewhat arbitrary lines, will
either be more willing to compromise or more easily marginalized by
the majority.
IV. THE OPTIMAL MIX OF GOVERNMENT RELIEF AND PRIVATE

INSURANCE
We turn now to the more normative side of the terrorism
insurance question - the issue of the optimal mix of government and
private relief (including insurance) for terrorism-related losses. Some
discussion of the various justifications for government intervention in
the private-terrorism-insurance market is a necessary part of this
analysis. Included will be our critique of the "insurance crisis"
rationale for the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of

2002

and our

assessment of arguments for subsidizing, in one way or another, the
private-terrorism-insurance market.
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Of Exaggerated Crises, "Uninsurable" Risks, and the Case for (and
Stronger Case Against) Government Intervention

A.

We have already described the apparent, or perhaps opportunistic,
panic in the insurance industry following the attacks of 9/11 and the
claim that those attacks had rendered terrorism risks, especially risks
to certain types of high-profile properties, essentially "uninsurable. "87
These concerns culminated in the enactment of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, which radically altered the public-private mix
with respect to terrorism-risk compensation.88 Some time has now
passed since the early prophecies of doom in the insurance markets,
and a good case can be made that terrorism-related property risks
never in fact became permanently uninsurable.
Even before the enactment of the new legislation designed to
stabilize the property-casualty insurance · market, there were private
insurers willing to cover terrorism risks, albeit at rates substantially
(and understandably) higher than those that prevailed pre-9/1 1.89
Moreover, past experience and sound insurance theory tell us that any
insurance problem produced by 9/1 1 is, in the long run, either modest
or nonexistent. Whatever insurance-availability problems appeared in
the

period

immediately

manifestations

following

of temporary

the

capacity

attacks

constraints

were

probably

caused

by the

unexpected claims on industry-wide reinsurance capital. Such effects
are

similar

to

those

that

followed

the

unusually

large

natural

catastrophes in the early 1990s, which were also temporary.90 Thus,
even without government intervention, as new capital entered the
market in response to the new demand for terrorism insurance,
coverage would likely have become more readily available and prices
would have fallen, though obviously not down to the level of pre-9/1 1
premiums.91
Of course, it may well be that the property-insurance market for
terrorism risks did undergo a permanent change (even with the
adoption of the federal regime), in the sense that standard commercial
property policies may henceforth contain broad terrorism exclusions.

87. See supra Part 11.C.
88. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2.
89. Jennifer Caplan, Political Risk: Run For Cover?, CFO.COM, at http://www.cfo.com/
Article?article=6557 (Jan. 22, 2002) ("(T]he private political risk insurance market,
particularly Lloyd's, is already offering stand-alone terrorism coverage."); Katherine
Griffiths, U.S. Army Turns to Lloyd's for Cover Against Terror Attacks, INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 19, 2002, at 15; Joseph B. Treaster, Insurers Find Profit in New Risk
Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 3, at 4 (describing new profitability of "political
risk" coverage).
90. Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, A Role for Government?, REGULATION, Winter 20022003, at 44, 51 (arguing against a governmental role in the terrorism-insurance market).
91. Id.
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Those who wish to secure terrorism coverage for their properties will
then need to buy separate and expensive terrorism policies or secure
terrorism coverage through existing "political risk" policies.92 But such
a change is not necessarily a sign of market failure; to the contrary, it
might

be

a

sign

that

the

private-insurance

market

is

working

reasonably well. Market segmentation of this sort is common for
earthquake and hurricane insurance, and there may be good reasons
for it. For example, some insurers may have a comparative advantage
in insuring such risks, while others may be particularly ill-suited to do
so.93 Customers may also prefer choice rather than the bundling of
insurance products.
Another lasting effect of

9/1 1

on property insurance and real estate

markets may be a significant increase in insurance premiums and
perhaps a reduction in the availability of coverage for certain kinds of
properties, such as skyscrapers and other high-profile landmarks, and
certainly for anything built at Ground Zero. This difficulty may reflect
the sensible judgment of the market regarding relative risks; some
properties carry a much larger terrorism risk than others. The market
may judge such structures to be too attractive a target for terrorists or
for copycat criminals, and hence insurance for those properties
without some government intervention may truly be unavailable at a
price any investor would pay. Moreover, there may be no sound
reason for the government to overrule this judgment with a subsidy or
mandate. That is, it is not obvious that the country's morale or the
overall health of the economy

requires

the construction of new one

hundred-story skyscrapers to replace those that were lost. It is even
possible that the current public debate over the future of the World
Trade Center site itself is influenced by a common understanding that
it would be foolhardy to reproduce what was there, because it would
offer too tempting a target for terrorist attacks. If, however, politicians
are determined to intervene in this market (as seems to be the case),
the government could simply promise insurance at low cost to
buildings built at Ground Zero if it deems reconstruction at that
location worthwhile for the national psyche or because of beneficial
externalities related to reconstruction of the area and those related to
the deflection of attention from other landmarks.

92. See Pasterick, supra note 81; FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES, supra
note 82.
93. Gron and Sykes note a comparative advantage rationale for this sort of market
segmentation. They first observe that, with respect to catastrophic risks such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, and now terrorism, the only insurers that can effectively provide coverage are
either those with enormous capital reserves of their own or those with efficient access to
reinsurance capital. Thus, they note that AIG, the best-capitalized insurer in the world, was
the first to come back and offer ground damage coverage for the airlines, a type of coverage
that the government had stepped in to supply in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 . Gron &
Sykes, supra note 90, at 48-49.

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:268

Existing skyscrapers in New York and in other cities may have
become more difficult to insure, but this problem is one of
redistribution rather than efficiency.94 That is, inasmuch as these
buildings have already been constructed, a sudden reduction in
insurance availability has the effect of reducing the wealth of the
buildings' owners and, depending on supply and demand elasticities,
perhaps the wealth of the tenants as well. But the inability to insure
existing properties would have little effect on investor or tenant
incentives. This redistributive effect may be exacerbated by the
disinclination of tenants to locate or remain in certain skyscrapers. It is
difficult to think of this as a market failure except to the extent that
the market fails to sort workers quickly into firms according to their
willingness to be employed in skyscrapers. In any event, insurance is
unlikely to solve this problem.
Thus, the uninsurability claim in our view is overstated, and the
move to specialized terrorism insurers is likely an efficient one. It is
furthermore our intuition, and it is the view of some other market
oriented commentators,95 that, even without .the new federal terrorism
insurance
bounced

regime,
back

as

the

terrorism-reinsurance

quickly

and

as

fully

as

market
the

would

have

natural-disaster

reinsurance market did following the earthquakes and hurricanes of
the 1990s. These conclusions, however, do not prove the absence of a
market failure to which the government might usefully respond.
Terrorism risks may be different from natural-disaster risks in ways
that suggest a potential role for the government as reinsurer or excess
insurer. Thus, a familiar argument heard in support of the Terrorism
Risk

Insurance

Act

was

that

terrorism

disasters

are

uniquely

unpredictable, so that intervention was necessary because the pricing
of insurance is especially problematic for the private market.96 There is
something to this argument, in that terrorists, unlike hurricanes,
intentionally seek to thwart prediction. Terrorists exploit the element
of surprise not only to avoid capture but also to maximize the
destabilizing effect of their attacks.

94. Note that these buildings might even serve as decoys or diversions of some value to
other structures. This phenomenon is closely analogous to the well-known diversion effect
that arises when individual property owners engage in differing levels of private but
observable precaution-taking. Steven Shaven, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft:
Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 1 1 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991) (showing,
among other things, that the individual incentive to divert crime away from oneself and to
others may lead to socially excessive private precaution-taking in some circumstances).
95. Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 647
(2002).
96. This view of the unpredictability of terrorism risks was incorporated into the
congressional findings in the preliminary parts of the Act itself. Pub. L. No. 107-297,
§ 101(a)(4), 1 1 6 Stat. 2322 (2002) ("Widespread financial market uncertainties have arisen
following the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 , 2001, including the absence of information
from which financial institutions can make statistically valid estimates of the probability and
cost of future terrorist events . . . . )
"

.
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Although this is a difference between terrorist attacks and natural
disasters, it may not be an important one. There is no reason to expect
that

the

presence

of intentional human agents makes

the

risk

inherently impossible to calculate. Many insurance policies cover risks
associated with intentionally caused harms, and this does not typically
present a problem so long as the intentional harm is not caused by the
insureds themselves. Large, sophisticated insurers can reduce the
initial

uncertainty

associated with

terrorism risks by

employing

terrorism experts, mathematicians, and game theorists to construct
models that reduce terrorism risks to something that is calculable.97
Competition among insurers would then drive premiums to the
actuarially correct level. To . some extent, again, this is already
happening. Thus, we might be encouraged (and somewhat alarmed)
when we see terrorism-insurance premiums skyrocketing for the
Golden Gate Bridge and other national landmarks - encouraged,
because the focus on these targets may mean that security will improve
through competition and government activity, and yet alarmed that
these risks are presently thought to be substantial.98
The

case

difference

for government

between

terrorism

intervention is

fueled

and natural disasters,

by

another

namely

the

location of expertise and information about these risks. In the case of
potential terrorist attacks, the government has powerful intelligence
gathering capabilities that no private insurer can muster - and this is
the sort of information that the government will not readily share with
insurance companies. Although it is easy to imagine an information
sharing partnership between the public and private sectors with
respect to natural disasters (so that meteorological and seismological
data might, for example, be exchanged), such an arrangement is
difficult to imagine with respect to terrorism.99 This difference between

97. There is some evidence that the country's mathematicians are beginning to get
involved in the business of terrorism prediction, albeit not expressly on behalf of insurance
companies. According to an interview on National Public Radio with Stanford
mathematician Kevin Devlin, there was a recent meeting of mathematicians in Washington,
D.C., to discuss just such types of research. According to Devlin, mathematicians may be
able to employ Bayseian inference techniques to narrow down the universe of possible
terrorist targets and disaster scenarios. Interview by Scott Simon with Kevin Devlin (NPR
Weekend Edition radio broadcast, May 18, 2002) .
98. According t o one report, almost immediately after 9/1 1, the insurance premiums for
the Golden Gate Bridge doubled, even though policy limits were drastically cut. Jane
Weaver, Paying Terror's Premiums (MSNBC television broadcast, Apr. 29, 2002),
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3073488/ (Apr. 29, 2002).
99. Although it is difficult to imagine the government sharing its intelligence regarding
terrorist targets with private insurers, the reverse - using private-insurance markets to
produce useful information for the government - is certainly conceivable. Indeed, the short
lived plan to create a market in "terrorism futures" would have produced a version of this.
The idea there was to generate new sources of reliable information regarding when and
where the next attack would occur by letting people - including (it was hoped) some people
with exceptionally good private information on the issue - essentially bet on the question,
and thereby profit from their information. When the program was made public, however,
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natural and human-made disasters might at first appear to suggest a
reason for government intervention in the manner of the British
system, in which the government is a reinsurer rather than a primary
insurer.100 But the reasoning is weakened by the realization that if the
government conceals information in the interest of national security,
then it is unclear how the government will be able to use that very
same information in designing and pricing its own brand of terrorism
insurance.101 Observers who value the behavioral effects that market
pricing can produce will thus be slow to approve of government
involvement in this arena.
On

the

other

hand,

there may

be

sound

reasons

for

the

government to offer reconstruction encouragements in the guise of
insurance subsidies in the post-9/11 world. It is easy to see that once a
business district is destroyed (especially if destroyed by terrorism,
domestic riots, atrophy, or other causes that may be expected to
continue or recur), there will be a disinclination among private
investors to be among the first to rebuild in the area. Many businesses
thrive

on

a

critical

mass

of

activity.

In

these

circumstances,

governments can do some good by leading the way with investments in
infrastructure and even incentives for early rebuilding.102 No doubt this
point could be exploited by politicians and private groups seeking
special treatment, and in a world with flawed governments and
overachieving interest groups, the best policy may be to avoid favoring
some building plans over others. We will proceed, however, with the
presumption that when the destroyed area is near major ports,
transportation hubs, accumulations of human capital, and

dense

residential areas, it is likely that rebuilding is socially desirable and
that the private

market might rationally and strategically await

government interventions to pave the way. In this context, what
appears as uninsurability may, in fact, be nothing more than a
reflection of strategic behavior emanating either from the supply side

there was an outcry among commentators and politicians, leading to a decision by the
Defense Department to end it. One of the main concerns was that terrorists themselves
might, either directly or indirectly, be able to profit from the program. See Reuven Brenner,
A Safe Bet, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2003, at AS.
100. On the British system, see infra Part IV.B. The Israeli example is not a reinsurance
scheme, rather, the coverage is provided directly, and citizens are included involuntarily. See
Sommer, supra note 36, at 343-50 (describing benefits under Israeli program).
101. Gron and Sykes make a similar point about the likelihood that the government will
charge premiums that are not based on actuarial calculations. See Gron & Sykes, supra note
90, at 49.
102. This was the logic of the now expired Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance
Act of 1968, the Federal Crime Insurance Program, and other systems promulgated under 12
U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21, to encourage business investment in riot-stricken areas.
See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 303 n.250 ( 1985). For a fuller discussion of these programs, see infra
note 131.
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or the demand side, or both, as property insurers and real estate
interests attempt to induce government aid. Nevertheless, it is at least
plausible that government money can be efficiently expended to
encourage the formation of a critical mass of business activity in
Manhattan and the surrounding area.
One obvious problem with the new federal terrorism-reinsurance
program as a response to the first-mover problem, however, is that the
program seems much broader than necessary to provide a subsidy for
the reconstruction of privately owned buildings in New York. The
program could have been limited to reinsuring the risk of terror
attacks in New York, if the primary goal were to provide a
reconstruction subsidy rather than a construction subsidy. Of course,
there is an obvious political explanation for why Congress would not
enact a federal-reinsurance program that would apply only to one
state, when there is at least a plausible case to be made that terrorists
will next strike someplace other than New York. Such an ex ante
program, by its nature, will almost have to be made generally
applicable to be politically feasible, since all voting j urisdictions can
imagine themselves (rightly or wrongly) needing such a subsidy. This
observation is entirely consistent with the provision of ex post relief
directed at New York only. There, the understanding is that if other
states suffer a terrorist attack, they will receive similar relief.103
B.

The Federal-Reinsurance Program

We turn next to a more careful analysis of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act, which again seems to be based, albeit rather loosely, on
the British model. Again, we should emphasize that the new terrorism
reinsurance program is mainly (and perhaps exclusively) a subsidy for
property-insurance markets, as was the British system on which it
appears to have been modeled.104 The British system, unsurprisingly,
was also adopted in response to increased terrorist activity. When
stepped-up IRA bombings caused most reinsurers to withdraw from
insuring property risks within the British Isles in

1993,

the British

103. Another potential justification for the subsidy for terrorism insurance relates to the
diversion effect mentioned supra note 94. If it is thought that individual property owners will
engage in inefficient private precaution-taking of the sort that mainly diverts the attention of
terrorists to the building next door rather than truly deters, then there is an argument for
government subsidized insurance to reduce this externality. DARIUS LAKDAWALLA &
GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM
(Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9215, 2002), available at
http://www .nber.org/papers/w9215. This argument acknowledges, of course, that the optimal
level of private precautions is non-zero, and may be substantial.
104. Note also that the Israeli scheme covers property losses as well, but the benefits are
provided directly by the government. See Sommer, supra note 36, at 353-58 (discussing
Israel's Property Tax and Compensation Fund Law of 1961). Thus, the Israeli model is not a
reinsurance model.
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Government intervened. Their solution was to form Pool Reinsurance
Ltd. ("Pool Re"), a mutual-reinsurance company set up by the
Association of British Insurers and the British government that
consists of approximately

115

insurance companies and

120

Lloyd's

syndicates.105 Under this regime, which is still in effect today, Pool Re
provides insurance coverage above the first

£100,000 of damage, which

is expected to be covered by companies applying to Pool Re for
reinsurance. Companies that wish to purchase Pool Re coverage must
do so for all of their properties, thus avoiding any potential adverse
selection. Funds for Pool Re are collected not only from policy
premiums, but also from a

3%

levy on all household and motor vehicle

policies written in Great Britain. If Pool Re has to pay out claims that
exceed its collected premiums, there is a "call" on all members to pay
an additional premium equaling

of the funds in the pool. Any

10%

amount above this is paid by the British government.106
The new U.S. terror-reinsurance system is somewhat different
from its British forbearer. Under the new program, adopted in

2002,

the federal government will cover losses arising out of " an act of
terrorism" as certified by the Secretaries of Treasury and State and the
Attorney General,107 subject to the following limitations. The program,
set to last for a three-year trial period, will cover only
property-casualty insurers'

90%

terrorism-related losses exceeding

billion (with the floor rising to

$15

of

$10

billion over the three-year

period).108 During this period, there will be a cap on the government's
terrorism-reinsurance liability of

$100

billion.109 Under this program,

insurance companies would be expected to pay off "smaller" claims up
to specified fractions of their collected premiums. Specifically, private
insurers will pay an initial deductible equal to a percentage of their
earned premiums.11° For losses above this deductible, the government
would again cover

90%

of the losses, with the insurance companies -

and their policyholders - bearing the

10%

co-payment.111 The funding

105. Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act, 1993, c. 18, § 2(a) (Eng.).
106. See William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of
Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 441, 441 (1994) ("The British
government has agreed to become the 'reinsurer of last resort' for losses caused by terrorism
on the British mainland.").
107. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 102(1)(A).
108. Id. § 103(e).
109. Id. § 103(e)(2).
110. 1 % for 2002, 7% for 2003, 10% for 2004, and 15% for 2005. Id. § 102(7).
111. Id. § 103(e ). If, for a particular terrorist attack, the sum of the deductibles and
copayments made by private insurers is less than $10 billion, then the federal government
will essentially tax the insurers the difference. As a result, the insurance industry must bear
the first $10 billion of terror-related risk. That is what is meant by the term "Insurance
Marketplace Aggregate Retention Amount" in § 103(e) of the Act. This retention amount
rises to $15 billion over three years. Between this (rising) floor and the $100 billion ceiling,
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for the program is expected to come from premiums or surcharges
imposed (and determined) by the Secretary of Treasury on property
casualty insurers.
The program also requires all property-casualty insurers doing
business in the United States to "make available" in their policies
terrorism coverage on roughly the same terms, amounts, and coverage
limitations as are applied to their non-terrorism coverage, although
the price of that coverage remains an open question.112 At the same
time, however, individual insurance purchasers can decline to
purchase the terrorism coverage if they so choose. The Act contains
no provision making the purchase of terrorism insurance mandatory,
and there is no set premium that must be charged for such coverage.
Thus, once an insurer has "made available" terrorism coverage at
some price, then the purchaser may decline. Insurance is thus available
in the sense that its offer is mandated, but the purchase of the
coverage is not required.113
As was suggested in the previous Part, a good case can be made for
the proposition that this legislation was unnecessary (and certainly so
in the long run, as new capital enters the terrorism-insurance market),
except,

perhaps,

as

a

further

construction

subsidy

for

lower

Manhattan.114 Advocates of free markets, for example, will complain
that government insurance generally tends to be inefficient.115 And
although last-resort reinsurance coverage leaves more space for the
private marketplace, it nevertheless intervenes where free market
proponents think intervention imprudent. Thus, although the British
approach of last-resort reinsurance may be superior to the Israeli
approach of occupying the entire market, either approach would be

the federal government (and federal taxpayers) will act as terrorism reinsurers of last resort.
Above the $100 billion cap, presumably the risks fall again to the private-reinsurance
market, although the possibility of ex post government relief cannot be eliminated. For an
explanation of the Act, see the Insurance Information Institute summary at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/septll/ (last visited May 20, 2004).
1 12. Specifically, the Act provides that each insurer "shall make available, in all of its
property and casualty insurance policies, coverage for insured losses; and . . . shall make
available property and casualty insurance coverage for insured losses that does not differ
materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable to losses
arising from events other than acts of terrorism." Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note
2, § 103(c)(l)(A)-(B). The price will be a function of (a) the actuarial market price for that
portion of the coverage that will not be federally reinsured (though it might be privately
reinsured) and (b) the prices that the Secretary of the Treasury ultimately decides to charge
for the federal reinsurance.
113. All terrorism exclusions in property-casualty policies in effect on the date of the
Act were expressly nullified, but, according to the Act, could be reinstated if the insurer
receives a written statement from the insured authorizing reinstatement, or if the insured
fails to pay the increased premiums. Id. § 105.
1 14. Again, a narrowly tailored construction subsidy might have limited the application
of the Act to insurance in New York State, but such an outcome seems politically unlikely.
1 15. Gron & Sykes, supra note 90, at 51.
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unwelcome from the perspective of those opposed to government
intervention. In contrast, advocates of a government-centered scheme
begin with the idea that it is the government's role to protect citizens
against external attacks and to ease the burdens such attacks create,
and they then move quickly to the view that the British approach does
not go far enough because war and terrorism ought to be

entirely

the

responsibility of the government.
There are other reasons to criticize a reinsurer-of-last-resort type
of subsidy, even if one takes some market-based intervention as a
given. First, for the regime to have its desired effect (of encouraging
the purchase of commercially provided terrorism coverage), it must
involve a substantial subsidy. Thus, it is not enough simply to require
insurers to make coverage "available." If the end price insurers charge
is not meaningfully reduced via subsidy from what those prices were
pre-9/1 1 , terrorism risks will remain " uninsurable," or at least as
uninsurable as they were before the new law. Hence, the subsidy must
be real. But the Act, as we have seen, leaves open the amount and
nature of the subsidy; the Treasury Secretary's discretion is a critical
feature of the scheme.116
A second internal criticism of the legislation focuses on the fact
that it does not actually require the purchase of terrorism insurance.
The law's noncompulsory character leaves open the possibility that
insureds may opt not to buy coverage - or to buy relatively little
coverage - in the hope of receiving ex post government relief upon
the occurrence of another terrorism disaster. The pattern might follow
that of flood insurance, where we have an optional scheme, sporting
semi-mandatory and subsidized insurance, with large numbers of
nonsubscribers who appeal for relief in the event of a disaster. At least
the flood-insurance program allows only one bite at the ex post relief
apple.117 We might have expected a similar rule to be applied here;
however, it is difficult to imagine that anyone harmed by a future
terrorist attack will be denied ex post relief for failing to purchase
what may still be very expensive

(albeit

"available")

terrorism

insurance. If the goal is to minimize ex post relief, then perhaps the
better approach would have been routinized (though modest) benefits
provided directly by the government, comparable to the Israeli
property-loss compensation regime.
That the new Act requires insurers to make terrorism coverage
available but not compulsory may also contribute to a particular sort

1 16. Even after the enactment of the federal terrorism-insurance regime, there is some
evidence that, in the areas considered to be the most likely targets for terrorist attacks, rates
for terrorism risk have yet to come down. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, D. C. Disputes Insurance
Study Raising Rates for Terrorism, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2003, at Al (reporting the District of
Columbia Insurance Commissioner as saying that D.C. will reject the large rate increases for
terrorism insurance in D.C. recommended by insurance industry ratemaking bureau).
1 17. See supra note 82.
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of political economy, or extemality, problem. The general power to
regulate insurance rates lies with state insurance commissioners; there
is no general federal regulation of insurance rates. The Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act leaves this unchanged, even for terrorism risks, except
that the Treasury Secretary is empowered to set the reinsurance
premiums that property-casualty insurers must pay if they wish to
receive federal terrorism reinsurance. Thus, if insurers seek large
increases for terrorism rates in such high-terror-risk j urisdictions as the
District of Columbia and New York, the insurance regulators can
refuse to authorize the increases and, because of the new law, the
insurers will still have to offer terrorism coverage in that j urisdiction or
withdraw from the market entirely.U8 To the extent insurers decide to
remain in these markets (perhaps because of a desire to maintain a
presence in the area and to profit from other lines of insurance that
are not as affected by terror risks), they would in effect be forced to
offer below-cost property insurance. Thus, in a small jurisdiction such
as D.C., insurance purchasers - that is, property owners - would
receive a significant cross-subsidy from policyholders and property
owners in the rest of the country. In larger markets (defined by single
regulatory schemes), such as New York or California, there would be
intrastate cross-subsidization as well.
In this manner, a sufficiently generous subsidy may induce some
insureds who otherwise would not have purchased terrorism insurance
to do so, while others may still (despite the subsidy) decide to do
without such coverage (and to allow insurers to insert exclusions)
because of their expectation that federal relief would be forthcoming
in the event of a disaster.119 This, in tum, might lead to more uninsured
property owners, which would inevitably create public pressure to
provide ex post relief as the victims in those gaps become apparent
following a disaster. It is thus easy to see an argument as to why
Congress should have taken the further step of actually requiring
insurance policies to include terrorism coverage, or forbidding them to
include terrorism exclusions. Such an outcome, however, was not to be
expected. Compulsory insurance, though not uncommon at the state
level (for example, consider auto liability coverage) is quite rare at the
federal level. Even the National Flood Insurance Program, with
respect to which there is a fairly strong argument to be made in favor

1 18. According to news reports, the D.C. Insurance Commissioner seems to be taking
precisely this approach. See Hsu, supra note 116.
119. Given that federal relief for disaster-related property losses is generally quite
meager (involving mostly loans, with small outright grants in some cases), opting out of
private insurance in anticipation of government relief may seem irrational. Nonetheless, the
combination of the high price of private disaster insurance and persistent this-will-never
happen-to-me optimism among property-insurance purchasers, decisions to opt out of
disaster-insurance coverage are quite common.
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of a compulsory insurance regime, is only semi-compulsory,120 and
many people who should purchase the coverage still do not.121
Moreover, to make the purchase of terrorism coverage compulsory for
all property owners under federal law would have required the
enactment of explicit subsidies to fund the purchase of terrorism
coverage in the highest risk areas. In contrast, as we have seen, the
approach chosen by the Act produces more hidden, but perhaps no
less substantial, cross-subsidies. Finally, note that federally mandated
coverage may also thrust federal regulators into the role of setting
primary-level insurance premiums (given that the premiums set by the
market might be deemed excessive and therefore federal regulation
necessary); this role of regulating insurance premiums has traditionally
been left to insurers and to state regulators.
C.

How Will the Federal-Reinsurance Program for Property-Casualty
Losses Affect Future Relief!
It bears restating that the new federal legislation deals primarily

with property losses and not (or at least not directly) with personal
injury and death. More precisely, the program pays benefits only for
qualifying terrorism-related losses that are covered by property
casualty insurers.122 Property-casualty insurance

includes

insurance and various forms of casualty (or liability)

property
insurance,

including workers' compensation coverage. It does not, however,
include life insurance or health insurance.123 Thus, while the federal
terror-insurance program can be seen as a subsidy for property and
casualty insurance, it provides no direct subsidy with respect to losses

120. The purchase of flood insurance since 1994 has been made mandatory in only a
limited sense. Federally subsidized mortgages are available only to those with flood
insurance. Moreover, all private mortgage lenders are now "required" to insist on a showing
of flood insurance not only at the time a mortgage loan is issued, but also during the
continuing life of the loan. Finally, for those property owners seeking relief aid (SBA loans
or FEMA grants) following a flood who have not purchased flood insurance, the relief aid is
made contingent on the purchase and future maintenance of flood insurance; those who fail
to buy flood insurance at that point are to be denied flood relief aid. See generally Pasterick,
supra note 81, at 153; FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 82. On the other
hand, there are no federal fines imposed on homeowners who fail to purchase flood
insurance as might exist under a serious (though unlikely) compulsory insurance regime.
121. Before the changes to the NFIP in 1994, there were studies indicating that less than
twenty percent of individuals living in floodplain areas and who were supposed to have flood
insurance, actually purchased such insurance. FEMA FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES,
supra note 82, at 2. One would expect compliance to have increased since the 1994
amendments to the program that introduced, for example, the requirement that lenders
insist on flood coverage throughout the life of mortgage loans. And it may have. It is
generally believed, however, that there is still significant underinsurance for flood risks.
122. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 102(5) (qualifying "insured losses"
defined as losses resulting from terrorist act that is covered by property-casualty insurance).
123. Id. § 102(12).
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of life or limb caused by terrorist attacks. Therefore, even if we think
of the program as a sort of permanent (routinized) regime for dealing
with property losses, it is unlikely to have a large direct effect on the
probability of future 9/11-Fund-type relief for loss of life. The real
question is whether the existence of the subsidy will affect the
likelihood of future disaster declarations and FEMA-type relief for
property losses.
As discussed

above,124

counterintuitive,

relationship

there

is

among

a

complex,
permanent

and

somewhat

compensation

regimes, private-insurance purchases, private charity, and, ultimately,
ex post government relief. Indeed, that is one of the major themes of
this Article. Thus, as an initial matter, if we assume that the subsidies
paid out ex post under the new program to property-casualty insurers
are substantial, there are reasons to expect that some property owners
who otherwise would not purchase coverage will at the margin be
induced to do so. This is so because some of the subsidy to property
casualty insurers may be passed along to consumers through reduced
premiums. And if the program works this way, inducing an increase
(or expected increase) in the purchase of private terrorism insurance,
we should expect less in the way of ex post relief. Given the additional
insurance, and thus the drop in uninsured losses, there will be less of a
sympathy factor, and perhaps less political pressure, to make a disaster
declaration. And even if a disaster is declared, less relief would be
forthcoming because of the uninsured loss limitations discussed above.
Finally, because the federal program will induce more ex ante
insurance purchases, it may inhibit charitable giving - on the theory
that donors' giving decisions in disaster cases are also affected by the
presence of uninsured losses.125
Although the driving force behind the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act was the (perceived) crisis in property-insurance markets, the
program is not limited to property losses. Technically, the program
covers any type of terrorism-related losses that are of the sort covered
by property-casualty insurers. Again, this does not include life or
health insurers, but it may include liability insurers. Although the Act
does not mention liability insurance specifically, the term "casualty"
insurance generally means liability insurance.126 Moreover, the Act

124. See supra Part III.
125. The argument in the text suggests one way in which the federal terrorism-insurance
program might affect the likelihood of future 9/11-Fund-type relief. The argument involves
the link, which we identified in Part III.B above, concerning relief for lost property and relief
for lost life. If we are right that large-scale government relief for property losses is politically
unlikely unless there is simultaneously a large-scale effort to compensate families of the
deceased, then a program that will ultimately produce less ex post episodic property relief such as this one - may also reduce the political pressure to enact a generous compensation
regime for lost life.
126. JERRY, supra note 77, at 47.
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does specifically incorporate workers' compensation insurance, which
is a type of liability insurance.127 Thus Congress at least had in mind
that in the event of another large-scale attack federal dollars could be
spent to pay workers' compensation claims. Such a possibility, if it
becomes widely known, could have some of the same effects on
charitable giving and ex post relief discussed above. The interesting
question, though, is whether, in the event of another attack sufficiently
large to trigger the new federal program, payments from the program
would also be used to pay tort awards and settlements arising out of
the attacks. On a straightforward reading of the Act, the answer would
seem to be yes, although Congress and the courts may construe it
otherwise, or the Treasury Secretary may issue regulations altering
that result. Still, if tort liability is expected to be covered, then there
would be reduced political pressure to provide ex post relief (of the
FEMA sort) or, more likely, increased political and financial pressure
for Congress to eliminate or at least impose limits on tort liability for
losses linked to the event.
D.
Even

if

one

were

Other Subsidy Alternatives
to

accept

the

propriety

of

government

intervention in the terrorism-insurance market, the superiority of the
particular type of subsidy embodied in the federal-reinsurance regime
is by no means self-evident. Instead of routinized relief, it might have
been better to use some sort of permanent regime of ex post
subsidization for charitable contributions in the event of disasters of a
certain magnitude. For example, the government could legislate that
when emergencies are designated as "national disasters," charitable
contributions

to

designated

relief

agencies

would

qualify

for

something much more attractive than mere tax deductions; donors
might, for example, be encouraged with

90%

tax credits. Private

insurance would be discouraged only as much as it is presently, which
is to say that insurance might go unsold to the extent that people
expected relief - or (tax) supercharged charitable relief.
There are at least two reasons to prefer a supercharged subsidy for
charitable gifts over direct government relief. First, there is the benefit
of decentralized private monitoring of the efficiency with which the
money is distributed. The idea here is that charitable organizations
may be more responsive to efficiency concerns and donor preferences
than is the federal government, because charities must continue to
earn the support of their donors. Uncoordinated private donations,

127. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 103(5). Indeed, the program's
application to workers' compensation losses is broader than with respect to other types of
losses. That is, the program does not apply to losses arising out of "war," unless they are
workers' compensation losses. Id. § 102(1)(B)(i).
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however, as opposed to centrally coordinated government relief, may
lead to the over- or under-compensation of some losses, so that
government relief may remain superior to better-monitored private
relief.
The second potential benefit of the supercharged charitable-giving
approach

requires

some

implicit

assumptions

about

relief

and

redistribution, including the idea that such an approach may actually
lead to more dollars of relief per tax-dollars spent than does direct
relief funded through tax increases. There is some evidence that, at
least with respect to high-bracket taxpayers, the price elasticity for
charitable contributions is greater than one: that is, for every dollar of
tax revenue foregone because of the deduction, more than a dollar of
charitable transfer is made to the relevant charity.128 That this effect
seems to be concentrated in high-bracket taxpayers is unsurprising
(given the relationship between the value of a deduction and the
taxpayer's marginal rate bracket) and suggests why a credit - and
perhaps a supercharged credit - might be desirable in some settings.
As another alternative, the government might simply subsidize,
through a demand-side deduction, credit, or direct cash transfer, all
property insurance that covers terrorism risk. Under such a regime,
the more significant the risk, the more insurance will be sold - and
there will be less pressure for relief in the event of large losses. Recent
legislation and current patterns in the insurance market seem to
assume that future terrorist strikes will resemble those of

9/11,

aiming

at large buildings in urban centers - especially those in D.C., New
York, and San Francisco.129 Yet other horrors are imaginable, and
while there is no need to spell them out here in gruesome detail, it
does not take much imagination to see that billions of dollars in
economic losses could be

suffered through terrorist attacks on

transportation networks and various industries, such that there would
•

again be a clamor for federal relief, and property insurance would play
a smaller role than business interruption or disability insurance, for
example. If the war on and with terrorists continues, we should not be
surprised to see the question of the structure of federal relief revisited.
And, again, an attempt to move expectations away from episodic
federal relief seems likely and under the circumstances healthy.

128. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 274
(1985) (summarizing studies which consistently found price elasticities greater than one in
absolute value for all but the lowest income groups; for low-income groups, the studies were
inconclusive); Charles T. Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 436 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds.,
1981) (finding highest price elasticities in higher income groups).
129. See Hsu, supra note 116.
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Does the Expectation of (Episodic or Routine) Relief Internalize
Costs?
A different sort of normative

question

about

disaster relief

(whether such relief comes predictably, episodically, or even
routinely) concerns the behavioral or cost-internalization function of
expected relief. Our focus is on government actors, and interest groups
that influence these actors and their budgets. One might argue that a
government that expects to pay relief in the event of famines and
earthquakes might be more inclined to take precautions that would
limit the

losses

suffered from such catastrophes.

These natural

disasters bring on losses, to be sure, but these losses can be curtailed
with good distribution systems, warning mechanisms, building codes,
and other items within the government's control. The prospect of
large-scale

payouts in the aftermath of major losses might, the

argument goes, encourage government to take cost-benefit j ustified
precautions long before disasters strike. This might happen because
the government is responsive to such an internalization tool, which is
how we might think of the budgetary pressure associated with
expected

relief

payments.

More

subtly

and

convincingly,

such

precautions might be encouraged by various interest groups eager to
see the government avoid large disasters, because these interest
groups project that expected relief efforts might one day crowd out the
government projects they desire.130
This argument about disaster relief as an indirect means of
encouraging precautions that are in the government's domain is surely
a weak one when it comes to post-terrorism relief or subsidized
insurance. First, the probability of large-scale attacks is low, and as we
have seen, governments and disparate interest groups could reason
that most terrorist incidents will not in fact be followed by relief
packages because the scale of loss will most likely be small. In
anticipation of the argument in the next Part we might say that most
terrorism is like most crime in the sense that most incidents impose
direct losses on very few victims and businesses, so that there is no
political pressure for aid. A graphic murder (or terror attack) might jar
a j urisdiction, or at least its eager politicians, into taking new steps to
reduce crime or fright, but it is less likely to create a movement for

130. See Levmore, supra note 34, at 18-19. The term "interest group" normally implies a
relatively small and well-organized politically active unit, and that is how we use the term
here. Note, however, that the internalization effect of creating an expectation of relief (or a
permanent regime of compensation) can also be driven not by interest groups per se, but
also by majoritarian politics. This could occur if the issue of large compensation payouts
were to become sufficiently salient (or were to be made salient by an issue entrepreneur)
such that the "average" voter might even demand a response. Thus, the budgetary pressure
mentioned in the text might be majoritarian pressure that would create the incentive to
prevent compensated losses from leading to large government deficits.
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economic relief, which seems t o require a massive scale o f loss. A
second reason that the prospect of post-terror relief is unlikely to play
an important role in encouraging pre-terror precautions is that such
precautions are

already

encouraged by political self-interest and, no

doubt, by a deeply held commitment to the safety of the country. It is
hard to imagine that politicians need much extra incentive to combat
and deter terrorism. Few things attract as much media and public
attention; the political repercussions from a successful but preventable
or foreseeable terrorist attack are enormous, and even politicians
appear able to rise to the occasions offered by war and terrorism such
that they do what they genuinely believe to be in the best interest of
the country, or perhaps in the interest of an attractive historical
record, rather than in their narrow self-interest, though it may simply
be the case that the two converge.
Thinking about post-terror relief (or pre-terror insurance and
subsidized insurance) in such functional terms may inform the division
of labor between governments and private property owners. Thus, it is
plausible that routinized relief, perhaps along the lines of the British
model or the new U.S. terror-insurance program, can send signals to
property owners as to what their losses might be, and that property
owners will in tum secure buildings more carefully or take other steps
that are more in their control than in the government's. Although
somewhat

plausible,

this

possibility

does

seem

unlikely.

The

government can mandate private security precautions, and even
the strongest proponents of privatization typically see the government
as having a comparative advantage

in

this regard.

It is worth

remembering, for example, that Israel's El Al Airline, which is
the only carrier known for taking extra (and, since the 1970s,
highly effective) precautions
government owned.
F.

against

terrorist attacks,

has

been

Summary

We are skeptical of the recent efforts by the federal government to
intervene in the terrorism-insurance market for property coverage. We
agree with other market-oriented commentators that if left alone the
market would likely have been able to provide the necessary coverage,
along with some useful signals as to the largest outstanding risks and
some valuable, if individually painful, cost-internalization incentives to
individual decision-makers. It may be that in the absence of such
intervention developers would have shied away from constructing very
tall skyscrapers, but that result is not patently unreasonable. In fact, it
is hard to imagine that the government has a positive-extemality
reason to encourage the very buildings that might impose the most
attractive targets. One could imagine a political movement to rebuild
the World Trade Center exactly as it was, structural improvements
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aside. This sort of symbolic or political reaction, amounting to a
statement

aimed

at

domestic

and

foreign

audiences

or

as

a

reaffirmation of the spirit of community, might indeed have required
some government subsidy or at least a promise of insurance coverage.
But by and large the private market is likely to perform well over the
long run.
To the extent that some sort of government intervention

was called

for - whether as a construction subsidy or as a potentially desirable
redistributive transfer from the rest of the country to the business
centers of our major cities - it remains unclear whether the particular
type

of subsidy chosen by Congress

reflects

the most effective

approach. Certainly, it should not be expected that the enactment of
this program will eliminate the possibility of future ex post relief
payments in the event of another catastrophe on the order of
long

as

insurance

is

not

compulsory,

there

will

9/11.

be

So

some

underinsurance and - as we have argued throughout this Article pressure to provide relief in the event of large disaster losses,
especially in the case of terrorism losses. A serious change in the war
on terrorism must take place before a routinized permanent regime of
terrorism-loss compensation is established. Nonetheless, even this sort
of regime will not do much in the way of creating improved incentives
for government decisionmakers, for existing political checks already
provide effective incentives in this regard.
In sum, the case for public and subsidized insurance covering
terrorism risks is surprisingly weak. In contrast - and as we are about
to explore - the case for public insurance with respect to the harms of
everyday crime is relatively and remarkably strong. The comparison
can be put in terms of a positive puzzle: given the mix of private and
public compensation that we have

described for disaster losses

(terrorism losses in particular), why do we not see a similar mix of
private and public compensation for losses of property and life caused
by crimes more generally? First-party insurance is generally available
for property and lives, but many crime-caused losses are uninsured;
yet there is generally no government relief or government liability
following crimes - even for crimes that the government might easily
have prevented.
The absence of government payments or "relief" - an expression
that we now expand to include government liability for the failure to
prevent losses - in the crime setting, taken together with the presence
of government relief in the terrorism setting, is especially interesting,
because a policy or expectation that the government will provide relief
for crime losses seems somewhat likely to provide a useful cost
internalization

or

incentive

effect

for

government

actors.

Governments do not seem to need much of a push to battle terrorists,
but government's inclination to prevent crime, and especially crime
that affects poorer citizens, appears to be less impressively encouraged
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by politics a s usual. The idea i s that governments at every level have a
strong political reason to take precautions against terrorism, if only
because there is no issue that is as salient to the electorate and as
central to the self-conception of our political leaders. In contrast, some
politicians seem to thrive (or at least to win reelection) despite rather
poor crime-fighting records. We might say that governments appear
naturally to internalize the costs of terrorism more than they do the
costs associated with crime. This is the argument that we explore in the
next Part.
V.

INSURING AGAINST CRIME

One conclusion that emerges from careful thinking about insuring
against terrorism is that there may be more to be gained from a
program of government-sponsored crime insurance, or a promise of
government relief for crime losses, than first meets the eye. The idea
of government crime insurance gives rise to both normative and
positive observations. As a normative matter, the argument for
subsidized crime insurance, or simply the promise of ex post relief
from

crime,

is

stronger

than

the

argument

for

government

involvement with terrorism risks. As a positive matter, the current
absence of a strong federal crime-insurance or crime-relief program is
likely attributable to failures of the political process - in the sense
that the parties most likely to benefit from such a regime are least
likely

to

overcome

collective-action

problems

enactment.131 It is worth emphasizing that

neither

to

lobby

for

its

form of relief -

131. Two efforts at the federal level to provide government-subsidized insurance for
crime, and government subsidies for general property coverage in high-crime areas,
respectively, were the Federal Crime Insurance Program ("FCIP"), which was created in
1971, and the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 ("UPPRA"). 12
U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 (2003) . Both were adopted in response to the urban riots
of the 1960s and a concern that widespread withdrawal of insurance coverage within urban
areas might ultimately contribute to decay in urban neighborhoods. See, e.g., ALICE R.
ZIMMERMAN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF PUB. AFF. SPECIAL REP., WHAT IS FAIR? AN
EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 'FAIR ACCESS TO INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS'
PLAN ON THE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF URBAN PROPERTY INSURANCE 29
(2000) (noting that the main stated purpose of the federal UPPRA was to "bring stability
back to the urban insurance market and reverse the cycle of decline in urban areas"); David
I. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 6 (1980) (asserting that the riots created· widespread refusals to insure in urban
areas). Under the FCIP, which was administered by FEMA through its Federal Insurance
Administration, the federal government provided small amounts of robbery and/or burglary
insurance ($10,000 for individuals and $15,000 for businesses) to tenants in high-crime areas.
Adrienne C. Locke, Several Criteria Restrict Crime Cover Eligibility, Bus. INS., Sept. 25,
1989, at 35. Premiums were collected to fund the claims, although there was some element of
government subsidy as well. Premiums were based on a rough degree of risk assessment and
on a showing of lack of affordable private insurance for the risk. Id. Thus, the FCIP was a
form of direct government insurance for inner-city crime losses. The UPPRA, in contrast,
was different; it was a program, not wholly unlike the Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Act,
under which the federal government agreed to provide subsidized riot reinsurance to private
insurers who participated in what are called Fair Access to Insurance ("FAIR") programs
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whether for crime or for terror - may be wise, unless the goal is to
express sympathy or engage in opportunistic wealth redistribution.
And it is also possible that both amount to sensible policies. The
argument here is simply that the case for crime relief is probably
sounder than that for terror relief. Terror can be seen as a subset of
crime, so that the argument can also be seen as one which takes the
continuing experience with the 9/11 Fund's post-terror relief as an
opportunity to think about crime relief more generally. The arguments
are simple and build in a straightforward fashion on the discussion up
to this point.
The best case for government-subsidized or government-provided
crime insurance (that is, for crime-caused losses of both life and
property) is one that combines a dose of awareness about potential
underinsurance

problems

considerations.

The

with

argument

internalization
gains

force

and
if

we

critical

mass

think

that

redistribution in favor of less affluent citizens is a good thing. We try
to set aside this consideration, however, if only because even those
who favor wealth redistribution through law might see that it is
generally more efficient to accomplish this goal through unconstrained
lump sum transfers rather than through ongoing regulatory or welfare
systems.132 Notwithstanding these considerations, there are, as we will
see, surprisingly sound arguments for government-sponsored crime
insurance or some comparable compensation or liability regime.133

by the states, under which all insurers operating in the states must participate in
providing insurance to the residual, or riskiest, market. Ultimately, both the FCIP and
UPPRA were eliminated. The former was abolished in 1996, see Office of Inspector General,
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FIA's Federal Crime Insurance Program, at
http://www .fema.gov/ig/h-09-95.shtm (last updated on Feb. 11, 2003), and the latter was
terminated in 1983, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb(b), although a number of states continue to
operate FAIR plans. We are aware of no definitive study on what caused the failures of
these federal efforts. There is some evidence, however, that one of the problems was lack of
adequate marketing. Carla Rivera, Few In Riot Area Used Federal Crime Insurance, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 1 992, at Al (asserting that evidence in California suggests "that residents of
riot-scarred communities who might have benefited from the insurance did not know of its
availability"). Another perceived problem was the feeling that the program was essentially a
subsidy for New York City, where roughly half of the nationwide FCIP policies were written
by 1992. Kevin McKenzie, Insurance; Government-Backed Protection from Crime Cancelled
in Tennessee, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 23, 1992, at Cl. In part due to this
perceived unfairness, many states began to opt out of the program throughout the 1980s.
Consumer Credit and Insurance Propeny, Insurance in Low Income Areas: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban
Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1994) WL14187690 (statement of Elaine A. McReynolds, Member,
Federal Emergency Management Agency). With respect to this last problem, one obvious
solution would be to make the program compulsory, so that opt-outs of this sort would
not occur.
run

132. For a reconsideration of this question, see Kyle D. Logue & Ronen Avraham,
Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157
(2003).
133. The idea of government-sponsored crime insurance has received scant attention in
the academic literature on crime, and no jurisdiction of which we are aware - in the United
States or elsewhere - has adopted the sort of crime-compensation regime that we describe
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But then there are counterarguments as well. The most significant
of these builds on the concern that a subsidized crime insurance or
crime relief program would create enormous incentives to commit or
tolerate crime. This is nothing more than an instance of the obvious
moral hazard problem according to which payments for death or
injury will result in more deaths and more injuries. Another, perhaps
less dramatic, concern is that a legal system that provided government
sponsored crime insurance but

not

government-sponsored terrorism

insurance would generate what we might call sorting costs, because of
the need to decide whether given crimes were or were not committed
by terrorists. These concerns are real but not insurmountable. Before
turning to these problems, however, it is useful to consider the
character of the existing market for crime insurance.
A.

The Crime-Insurance Market

Losses from crime include life and property, and we consider both
here, if only to parallel our discussion of terrorism coverage. We are
not claiming, as some have done in the terrorism context, that there
should be general government involvement in compensating crime
losses due to an uninsurability problem. To the contrary, crime-related
losses to both life and property can be, and often are, covered under
standard insurance policies. In the typical life-insurance case, where
family members are the beneficiaries of a policy that is written on the
life of the primary earner in the family, the death benefit will be paid
out whether the insured dies of natural causes or is murdered.134 Life
insurance policies generally do not contain

murder or foul-play

exclusions. Special murder policies - policies that pay out only for
murder - are not generally used (and likely would be considered void
as against public policy), both because it is thought that standard life
insurance policies do the job well enough and because explicit murder
policies might be considered too much of an invitation to moral
hazard.
Many property-insurance policies are equally broad. Standard
property policies tend to cover crime-related property losses, which
means that such policies do not generally contain crime exclusions,

and defend in this Part. Some countries do have government-provided "crime
compensation" programs, but those regimes offer minimal benefits above what those
countries' relatively generous social insurance programs already provide. See, e.g. ,
COMPENSATING CRIME VICTIMS: A EUROPEAN SURVEY (Desmond Greer ed., 1996)
(summarizing crime-compensation regimes in European countries). Some U.S. states also
have minimal crime-compensation regimes. See, e.g. , The Office of Mass. Attorney Gen.,
Victim Compensation and Assistance, at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/victim_svc/index.asp?
headl=Victim+Services&section=8 (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
134. This assumes, of course, that the beneficiary is not the murderer, which would
amount to a very egregious form of insurance fraud - as well as murder.
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although there are exceptions.135 In addition there are special crime
loss policies; for example, insurance companies offer business policies
covering robbery and employee theft. These policies may fill in gaps
(perhaps left by the occasional crime-related exclusion) in standard
property policies, or they may provide additional or overlapping
coverage.
B.

The (Modest) Case for Government-Sponsored Crime Insurance
1.

The Underinsurance Argument

Given that there exists a market for insurance against many of the
risks

associated

with

crime,

why

would

we

need

government

involvement? The arguments contain elements of paternalism and
market failure, and to some extent repeat those referred to in our
earlier discussion of terrorism. One argument in favor of government
sponsored crime insurance is that additional coverage is desirable
because individuals tend to purchase inadequate coverage for a variety
of contingencies. This problem of myopia or a disinclination to dwell
on unpleasant eventualities would seem to apply most clearly to life
insurance purchases,136 but it is plausible for property insurance as
well,137 and it is an argument that extends rather easily to planning and
insuring against crime.
Taken alone, however, the concern with underinvestment in
insurance would probably not be enough to justify government
intervention in crime-insurance markets, given the moral hazard
concerns discussed below and given that there may be better ways of
dealing with a general problem of underinvestment in property and
life insurance - if such a problem does indeed exist.138 There are,
however, reasons to suspect that the underinsurance problem is
especially significant with respect to crime losses and, thus, that a
crime-compensation regime or crime-insurance subsidy might be more
justified than a similar regime for, say, disaster losses.

135. Some property policies contain exclusions for thefts under certain conditions. For
example, in an obvious effort to minimize moral hazard, some property policies limit theft
coverage to situations in which there is visible evidence of forced entry. See, e.g. , Atwater
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (interpreting "forcible
entry" clause in burglary policy).
136. See Logue, supra note 18, at 28 (analogizing problem of underinvestment in life
insurance to well-known problem of underinvestment in retirement savings).
137. A mitigating factor in property-insurance markets, however, is the involvement of
commercial lenders, who tend to insist on a certain amount of property coverage before
approving mortgage loans, and, who one would expect, because of repeat play and
competitive pressures, to suffer less from myopia and other cognitive biases.
138. If underinsurance is a general problem, then a broader solution would seem to be
called for than one which focuses on crime-related risks alone.
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Many victims of crime are underinsured. Inner-city property
owners, including businesses and homeowners, self-insure far more
than their counterparts in affluent areas, in part because of availability
problems. 139 In addition, inner-city property owners and the businesses
they deal with may expect crime to lead to insolvency, so that
insurance of a sort is accomplished through higher interest rates and
less credit with respect to goods and services. As far as life insurance is
concerned, it simply is not possible for low-income earners to purchase
significant insurance coverage, even though the value of their lives to
their families can be substantial in economic terms. Thus, with respect
to life insurance and in some cases homeowners' insurance, the
underinsurance problem, especially in inner cities, has a distributional
component.
In contrast, although there is no doubt that many of the victims of
the

9/11

tragedy were underinsured, there is no reason to think that

the bulk of them were

as underinsured as most crime victims are, given

their relative wealth. More interesting, when we turn to our third front
(namely, natural disasters), those who receive flood and earthquake
relief can be thought of as underinsured due to anticipation of
government relief. Underinsurance may even be considered a strategy
for seeking relief, and perhaps therefore not an especially powerful
normative justification for such relief. Victims of crime, by contrast,
have no reason to expect relief because their losses are episodic and
not normally of the sort that trigger large-scale relief or charitable
efforts. The idea of payments to these underinsured persons thus
seems more palatable than comparable payments to victims of floods
and earthquakes. One can think of such payments as redistributive, to
be sure, but one can also think of them as aiming to encourage
economic activity and a residential presence in inner cities and other
places where crime is prevalent and where a population revival would
probably lead to less crime and to greater economic growth. We turn
to this justification more fully in the next Part.140

139. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 131; Robert Klein, Availability and Affordability
Problems in Urban Homeowners Insurance Markets, in INSURANCE REDLINING:
DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
43 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997); Gregory D. Squires et al., Insurance Redlining, Agency
Location, and the Process of Urban Disinvestment, 26 URB. AFF . Q. 567 (1991).
140. We need not resort to an argument that there is underinsurance for noneconomic
losses; the family of a victim may not be made whole by receiving money in return for life,
but an important part of the plan, as discussed more fully below, is to give the government
a budgetary incentive to fight crime, so that payments for noneconomic losses make
excellent sense.
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The Internalization Argument

Internalization arguments build on the idea that a party will take
the implications of what it does more seriously if it is made to pay for
the consequences of its actions. When firms or governments are made
to pay, however, there is reason to doubt the internalization logic,
because there are agency problems and other barriers between the
expected payments and the employees on the front line who act in the
name of the firm or government. Yet there is no doubt that monetary
burdens will eventually have an impact on governmental (and other
enterprises') actions. If courts raise the compensation level required of
governments that take private property for public use, we can, for
example, expect these governments to take less property. When we
say that liability may

not be necessary to make the government combat

terrorism effectively it is not because governments do not care about
making payments, but rather because it seems likely that the political
repercussions

following

an

incompetently

managed

war

against

terrorism are likely to motivate government officials at least as much
as any monetary incentives.
In the case of crime fighting, the argument is that the same
governments that might be dismissed by the electorate in the event of
failed wars, unchecked epidemics, and other such failures, might
survive perfectly well even though a minority of the population
continues to live in fear of crime and suffers greatly from it. In these
circumstances, economic incentives aimed at the government, or, in a
subtler version of the argument, at interest groups in positions to
influence the government, may play an important role. Specifically, a
government that pays for crime, or for losses suffered where there are
high crime rates, might do a superior job at fighting crime, or
budgeting the resources necessary to do so.
This argument is premised on the assumptions that crime can be
discouraged and that, while the government is the obvious party, or
even the only party, to take both the costs and the benefits of crime
prevention into account, it might not have the incentive to do so if left
to its own devices. In a simple sense, the argument is that the
government could be encouraged with economic incentives to do that
which is largely already in its control. The argument becomes more
compelling the more we think of the government as politically
unresponsive to many of crime's victims. This is especially true of the
vast number of

ordinary

crime victims - individuals and businesses

whose cases, because they are so numerous, are not reported in the
media and do not thereby garner public sympathy. These victims may
not be brought together as a political unit by a single, galvanizing
event, as happens with terrorist attacks or disasters more generally,
and thus may lack the power necessary to attract political attention
and government action.
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In sum, to the extent that crime victims, or those who live in fear of
becoming crime victims, are diffuse and poorly organized, and to the
extent that a large part of the population need not share the fear that
these victims bear, crime losses may be undervalued by local and state
authorities, and are certainly undervalued by federal government
officials. Crime rates in some areas may then be higher than is
optimal.141 Given the presence of imperfect political checks and
market failures, economic incentives become more valuable
instruments of reform. At the very least, interest groups that make
claims on the government's resources may take the task of crime
fighting more seriously if their own projects are threatened by the
payouts that the government would need to make in a world where
crime insurance was the government's concern.
Interest groups would also play an important role if the proposal
were structured not as government-provided ex post compensation for
crime losses, but as an ex ante subsidy for privately provided crime
insurance. This approach, which is more market-based than the direct
crime-insurance alternative, would enhance crime-cost internalization
by creating a cohesive and potentially powerful interest group - the
insurance industry - with an interest in crime prevention. Once a
number of large property insurers have been induced, via the subsidy,
to sell policies on buildings located in high-crime areas, those insurers
will have an enormous financial stake in seeing that property crime is
reduced in that area. Thus, just as auto insurers compose a powerful
political force in this country for increased auto-safety standards, so
too the property and life-insurance industry under this sort of regime
would have an interest in encouraging lawmakers to adopt effective
crime-reducing measures.142
What would an ex ante crime-insurance subsidy look like? It could
appear on the demand side or the supply side. The subsidy could take
the form of a tax deduction or credit available to individuals who
purchase property insurance on buildings located in high-crime areas.
Alternatively, the subsidy could be on the supply side, perhaps
administered through some sort of government-provided reinsurance
for crime-related losses. Such a proposal would be analogous to the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act program, except that the government
would provide reinsurance for acts of crime rather than for acts of
terrorism. As with that program, adverse selection problems could
give rise to the need for a rule compelling insurers to provide crime

141. This is a theoretical claim about the structure of incentives for crime prevention.
The claim, if right, applies even though crime rates may have gone down in recent years. The
point is that, under a crime-compensation regime, crime rates might have decreased even
further.
142. We predict that this phenomenon is already taking place with respect to legislation
designed to reduce auto theft, given that many auto-insurance policies currently cover such
losses.
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coverage (or not to exclude such coverage) in their general property
policies.

This would be similar to the prohibition on terrorism

exclusions in the Act.143 In addition, the crime-insurance program
might go so far as to compel property owners, or owners in some
areas, to purchase crime coverage. As mentioned in the previous Part,
however,

there

are

practical

and

political

limits

to

enforcing

compulsory insurance laws.144

The Critical Mass Argument (or the First-Mover Problem)

3.

The critical mass argument applies primarily to property insurance
and may provide the strongest basis for advocating government
involvement in crime-insurance markets. The concern is that efficient
and desirable economic development might be stifled or foregone
where private actors wait for one another to move forward. In
particular, a high-crime area might require a first mover, or a promise
of development, to induce investors to come forward. The collective
action problem among business owners, real-estate developers, and
property insurers is that, whereas business investment in high-crime
areas may ultimately be profitable if enough businesses decide to
locate there (or decide not to move away), there is relatively little
incentive for any single business or insurer to take the first step.
Indeed, the underinsurance problem within urban areas mentioned
above, especially with respect to property coverage, may be in part
attributable to this critical mass or first-mover problem.145 Therefore,
government-subsidized or government-provided insurance in high
crime areas might serve to signal or guarantee that an investment in
such an area is better than it seems to private investors who cannot yet
observe the influx of other, like-minded investors. Moreover, if one is
persuaded by the internalization argument, the announcement of such
a government program should credibly signal a renewed commitment
to crime prevention on the part of the government, and thus lower
crime-insurance premiums in the long run.
C.

Objections to Government-Sponsored Crime Insurance
1.

Sorting Costs

We argued in Part IV above that the case for government
sponsored terrorism insurance is rather weak, at least in the current
state of the world. In this Part we have argued that the case for

143. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 2, § 105.
144. See supra note 82 (discussing the difficulties that the National Flood Insurance
Program has had in "compelling" purchase of flood coverage).
145. See supra Part V.B.1.

Terrorism and Crime

November 2003]

321

government-sponsored crime insurance is relatively strong. Thus, we
might imagine a regime in which crime but not terrorism losses were
compensated by the government - or by an insurer who in turn
receives subsidies from the government. Under such a regime, then,
there would be a need to distinguish general crime losses from
terrorism losses. An obvious objection to such an approach would be
to raise the specter of sorting costs and to suggest that we can have
either relief for terror and crime, or relief for neither, but not for j ust
one of the two. This objection seeks to avoid the litigation and other
transaction costs that will be associated with determining whether a
death or property loss was caused by terrorist activity or by mere
crime. This need to distinguish terrorism from other crimes arises, of
course, in a system of relief or subsidized insurance that covers crime
but excludes terrorism losses, j ust as it does in a scheme that covers
terrorism but not other crimes.
It seems fair to assume that this sorting problem is a minor one,
especially when evaluated on the scale of the potential costs and
benefits arising from crime insurance. The sorting cost is likely to be
modest because terrorists, in more cases than not, take credit for their
deeds, while most criminals seek to draw less attention to their
identities.

The

9/11

attacks

are

an

important

and

perhaps

overwhelming counterexample, but it is hardly unreasonable to say
that terrorists take credit for their deeds far more often than do
ordinary criminals.
It could be otherwise; terrorists might for example seek to advance
their causes by over-claiming, taking credit for crimes, such as arsons
and deaths, that were not of their doing. In such cases, the information
received following a loss event would be virtually useless. The over
claiming phenomenon, which doubtless happens on occasion, would
obviously work at cross-purposes with those terrorist organizations
that do in fact commit the terrorist acts and that wish to maintain the
clarity and control of their messages. An obvious response to this
over-claiming phenomenon on the part of such terrorists would be for
the terrorists to identify themselves before an event rather than soon
after, and this they sometimes do. This sort of signaling technique was
common, for example, in the case of the Irish Republican Army,
though it is either uncommon or unheard of in Israel's intifada and in
other theaters. The media have often regarded advance notice as a
humanitarian gesture aimed at saving lives, but we now see that it is
possible that this is a strategy for taking credit where it is due.146

146. It is also unclear how the prospect of victim compensation or relief affects the
motives of terrorists, either in the choice of their targets or their decisions to claim credit or
not. Under a regime of compensation for terrorism but not for other crime, terrorists might
consider whether their objectives are better achieved by imposing compensated or
uncompensated losses. But this issue seems quite small when compared with the other sorts
of calculations that will come into play.
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Another way of ensuring proper credit (which is to say blame) would
be for the perpetrators to disclose details of the attack that have not
been made public and that only the they would know.
There is no need to dwell on this issue. We are not arguing that
there will be no sorting costs; our point is that those costs should be
relatively low and should not be different in kind or magnitude from
the sorting costs that are associated with any type of insurance regime.
Private-insurance contracts, for example, generate huge sorting costs,
as policyholders and insurers spend enormous sums litigating the
question of whether a particular loss is covered or excluded under the
policy in question. One strategy from the insurance context for dealing
with these costs is to use the burden of proof as part of the sorting
process. In most insurance coverage cases, the burden of proof lies, in
the first instance, with the policyholder to demonstrate that a claim is
covered under the policy - that the individual is the named insured,
that an insured event has occurred, and the like. Once this showing has
been made, the burden switches to the insurer to prove the existence
of a particular exclusion that excuses coverage.147 Thus, under a
terrorism compensation regime, insureds or claimants for relief might
be given the burden of proving that a loss was caused by terrorists, or,
under a crime compensation regime, that it was not caused by
terrorists. It is noteworthy that Israel, which again offers modest relief
for victims of terror but hardly anything for victims of other crimes,
has

had

little

difficulty with sorting between

the

two.

In

one

exceptional Israeli case, the murder of an Israeli by a Palestinian who
had been the victim's lover raised the crime-versus-terror question
because the claimants argued that animus against Israelis contributed
to the perpetrator's motivation.148 Cases such as this one seem to be
remarkable rather than normal; they should not be seen as harbingers
of incessant litigation.
A much more serious sorting problem would likely arise in
distinguishing between crimes and accidents rather than between

147. Consolidated Edison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 690 (N.Y. 2002)
("Generally, it is for the insured to establish coverage and for the insurer to prove that an
exclusion in the policy applies to defeat coverage."); see generally 9 LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 137:5 (3d ed. 2003) (summarizing the burden of proof in insurance cases).
148. In Coca v. Approving Auth. , an Israeli District Court held that murder did qualify
as a "hostile act," thereby invoking the program's relatively generous terror-compensation
benefits. See Sommer, supra note 36, at 340-42 (citing V.A. (T.A.) 4076/98, Coca v.
Approving Auth., 32(10) Dinim-Dis. Ct. 485). The Israeli legislature has created a rebuttable
presumption that " [w]here a person has been injured under circumstances affording
reasonable grounds for believing that he has sustained an enemy-inflicted injury, the injury
shall be regarded as enemy-inflicted unless the contrary is proved." Victim of Hostile Acts
(Pensions) Law, 1 970, 24 L.S.I. 131, (1969-70). Such a presumption is unsurprising in a
country that experiences as many attacks as Israel does, and that wishes to avoid significant
litigation over close cases. Interestingly, however, there is no such presumption in property
damage cases, although there too Israeli courts face the terror-crime distinction. Sommer,
supra note 36, at 355.
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(mere) crimes and terrorism. Any system of crime insurance or other
payments must deal with cases where there is arguably criminal
wrongdoing and also a massive tort. Generally speaking, we assume
that the higher standard necessary for a criminal conviction will serve
to police this line. In any event, we might think of the crime-insurance
plan as beginning with very specific crimes rather than all crimes.
Murder and armed robbery might be crimes with which to begin.
There is probably little reason to fear that governments will quickly
lower

these

crime

rates

and

allow

other

uninsured

crimes

to

mushroom. Moreover, all these insurance schemes work best when the
government pays for losses after a certain threshold, so that it is high
crime rates, rather than all crime, that trigger payments.

2.
The

strongest

The Moral Hazard Problem

argument

against

government-sponsored

crime

insurance will already have occurred to most readers. There is a
formidable potential for moral hazard associated with compensation
for crime-related losses. On the life-insurance side, compensation at
the high levels provided, say, by the

9/11

Fund could certainly cause an

increase in the murder rate. No life-insurance company would agree to
a million dollars of term or whole life insurance on every citizen of a
city at prevailing rates, because the provision of such coverage, even at
rates that were initially set by the prevailing market, might well lead to
murders or to negligence on the part of likely beneficiaries. The life
insurance market would soon spiral out of control. Companies do
agree to sell life insurance to groups, but the amounts are modest in
comparison to the known earnings of the members of the group. These
insureds are then worth more alive than dead to their beneficiaries. It
would be startling, therefore, to see life insurers offering substantial
amounts of group life insurance to unemployed persons. Without the
ability to reduce coverage amounts or to screen applicants or even
beneficiaries (as is possible with employer-provided group coverage),
insurance costs would rise, squeezing out good-faith purchasers. Put
differently, insurance companies cannot easily gather information
about disaffected relatives or disgruntled business partners, and so
they will decline to enter into a contract that gives the beneficiary an
incentive to prefer that the insured be dead rather than alive. The
moral hazard issue is, if anything, of yet greater concern to the
government when it is the insurer, because it cares or ought to care
about the lives of its citizenry more than any for-profit insurer does.
For-profit life insurers will seek to prevent murders because murder
prevention increases profits; in contrast, the government as life insurer
is, or ought to be, concerned about murder rates for intrinsic as well as
for revenue reasons. The moral hazard problem also extends to
coverage for property crimes (or insurance); full compensation would
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surely generate an increase in the number of reported thefts, arsons,
vandalism episodes, and other purported crimes.
How might a government-sponsored regime of crime insurance or
relief respond

to these serious concerns? This question can be

considered in connection with direct government relief for crime
related losses or with the crime-insurance subsidy alternative. In both
cases, the private-insurance market can be instructive.
First, at a minimum, we must imagine that crime relief would
provide modest benefits, or amounts that could be shown to represent
no more than true economic losses. Much as a jewelry store owner
who carries theft insurance might find his recovery limited to the
actual cost of stolen goods in order to avoid the moral hazard and then
the self-destructive market that we can associate with payments that
generate a profit in the event of an alleged theft, so too we must limit
the insurance or relief for loss of life to modest amounts in an attempt
to reduce harmful temptations.149 Yet the very reduction in temptation
effected through such cautious coverage might as a political matter
doom crime relief from the start. If the families of wealthy or high
earning crime victims can receive larger amounts of relief, while the
families of poor victims receive skeleton amounts adjusted to reflect
anticipated lost earnings, there arises the problem of the government
investing more resources in crime fighting in affluent areas than in
poor ones. Governments may already allocate resources and political
chips in this manner, but the idea of making it more obvious, and even
encouraging more protection for wealthy persons than for destitute
ones, is unimaginable at the political level. It will be politically
unacceptable to find governments balancing their budgets in difficult
periods by moving police cars from higher-crime poor neighborhoods
to lower-crime affluent ones, in order to economize on relief costs.
Any such relief system would reinforce the politically unattractive idea
that the government should internalize earning power, valuing well
dressed citizens more than struggling ones.
Income disparities do appear to be politically acceptable in the
operation of the 9/11 Fund, both because the recoveries were
structured to take the place of tort recoveries, which could themselves
be income based and which would no doubt have been sought at a
greater rate if the Fund had offered very modest payments to high
earners'

families,

and

because

the

moral

hazard

problem

was

nonexistent inasmuch as 9/11 was an unexpected horror. Murders and
traffic accidents may be within the control of victims and their families,
especially so because many are known to go unsolved, but the

149. There are other numerous analogies from private-insurance markets that would be
relevant here. For example, many auto collision policies require repairs actually to be made,
that is, they will issue checks only to the party doing the repair - and in some cases only to
the repair person picked by the insurer.
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bombing of lower Manhattan was hardly in the control of the victims.
It is of course possible to imagine a future tragedy in which a
calculating and very troubled rescue worker dashed into a building
with knowledge that, if death strikes, his surviving family will be
wealthy. But none of this can be the case with respect to

9/11

itself, for

which there was no close precedent.150
One method of escaping this

set

of moral-hazard problems

associated with crime relief is to make the required payments more
substantial, but then have the payments go not to the victims' families
but rather to some third party that is not in a position to exacerbate
the hazard. Thus, if the government paid half a million dollars
following each murder (or each unsolved murder, or each murder
above some modest base rate) and transferred this amount to a group
of local charities (and perhaps even to a group whose members were
not identified precisely at the start of each year), it is unlikely that the
crime relief payments would give anyone an economic incentive to
commit a crime. A major problem with this plan, however, is that it
reduces the idea of crime relief to an academic exercise, since it is
difficult to imagine politicians agreeing to a system in which tax
revenues must be raised, and in which disbursements are undertaken
in a manner that advertises the government's own failures with respect
to crime, but in which the funds then go not to voters or victims but
rather to parties that are situated outside the political process. Indeed,
in the preceding sketch, the funds would go to organizations that could
be seen as competing with the government. But the basic point
remains to encourage crime prevention and economic development in
high-crime areas by using economic incentives, and at the same time to
combat the moral hazard by directing these payouts to parties that are
not in the position to increase the crime rate.
A palatable alternative may be to combine the two schemes j ust
described.

We

might

seek

to

encourage

crime

fighting

and

responsiveness to the citizenry by requiring the larger payments from
the government, and we might make these payments uniform,
regardless of the earnings of the victim, in order to make the scheme
politically and morally acceptable. But then the victims and an outside
set of charities might have claims on the payments only as required to
avoid any moral hazard. The payments could go to a "Crime Fund,"
and the Fund's manager could be instructed to pay victims or their
families only so much as necessary to replace provable lost earnings,
with a cap of perhaps half a million dollars. The Fund would develop a

150. It is also noteworthy that the reduction in 9/11 Fund payouts for life insurance and
pension benefits (payable on death) flattens the payouts from the Fund. It is as if high
income families are favored by the formula calling for payments to be a function of lost
earnings but, in return, high-income families do worse, both in relative and absolute terms,
because insurance recoveries reduce what one receives from the Fund, and high earners are
extremely likely to have more of this insurance, or collateral source, than are low earners.
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balance, as many beneficiaries would receive less than that amount,
and then the Fund's surplus could, on a periodic basis, be distributed
to specified (or, to fight moral hazard yet more, to unspecified)
charities.151
The only reason we have not been insisting on per-life payments of
the magnitude used in risk management calculations, ranging from
perhaps

$1

million to

$5

million, is that moral hazard dangers are

present, and political pressures will likely prevent payments to wealthy
families that are dramatically greater than those made to poor ones.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the nonprofit sector (or other
recipients of the surplus insurance payouts described above) could
absorb large amounts of funding without producing new inefficiencies.
Ideally, the surplus payments would go to other crime fighting causes,
but that method of allocation is a topic left for another day.

3.

Other Objections

There are, to be sure, other serious objections to a scheme in which
the government pays when the crime rate is high. There is, for
example, the danger that a government threatened with liability for
high crime rates will simply redefine crimes, or so underenforce
criminal prosecution as to make crime rates look lower simply because
victims do not bother to report the crimes in question. At least insofar
as crime fighting is concerned, the sort of scheme described here must
be put into force by a government (though perhaps one that seeks to
monitor a subordinate government unit) rather than brought about
through liability that is imposed by courts. Thus, it is plain that if a
state means to control a municipality in this way, it cannot allow the
municipality to define the crimes in question. We imagine a state
sponsored

scheme

in

which

local

governments must

insure

or

otherwise pay when they exceed rates set and defined by the state. The
state would need to take steps to make sure that citizens could report
serious crimes even where the local government preferred to ignore or
deny the crime. Alternatively, we can imagine innovative politicians
putting such a scheme into effect in order to bind themselves and
those who follow them in office.
There is also a danger that crime payments of the sort sketched
here would perversely cause an increase in crime. This might occur if
government payments drew away funds from the very tools that
governments use to fight or prevent crime. Perverse effects of this kind
are of course possible, though rare, but we have some faith that a well
drafted and flexible scheme could avoid such unusual effects. In any
event, one aim here is merely to introduce the idea of crime insurance

151. Other plans are discussed in Saul Levmore, Citizen, Warranties and Majorities, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 409 (2004).
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and to contrast crime insurance (or other payment forms) rather
favorably with terrorism insurance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the adoption of the
and

the

new

federal

9/11

Victim Compensation Fund

terrorism-reinsurance

regime,

we

have

encouraged the idea of, or at least a comparison to, and a thought
experiment about, government-sponsored crime insurance. But our
aim has not been to insist that we must try such a scheme, be it local or
national in design. Nor has it been to weigh in on the question of
federal terrorism coverage. Instead, we have simply suggested that the
case for crime coverage is superior to that for terrorism insurance.
This

is

because

financial

responsibility

might

well

make

the

government a better crime fighter, the underinsurance problem is
surely greater for crime in impoverished communities than it is for
terrorism anywhere, and the likelihood that crime insurance will
generate desirable economic externalities is substantial.
At the same time, the political emergence of terrorism coverage but not crime coverage - is unsurprising. Our analysis began with the
observation that after-the-fact episodic relief often pours forth after
catastrophic events, so that disaster insurance can be understood as a
way

of

providing

certainty

and

encouraging

modest

insurance

requirements at low cost. The idea is that since relief payments will be
made one way or another, they might as well be marshaled in a way
that provides some salutary effects in advance of a disaster. In
contrast, very few crimes elicit sympathetic, public relief of significant
magnitude, if only because few persons or properties suffer in any one
event, so that media coverage and political interest are limited.
However formidable the normative argument in favor of crime
insurance, it is terrorism coverage that we ought first to expect.
We would like to see some experimentation with crime insurance.
The moral hazard problem associated with crime insurance could be
solved, as suggested, by making partial payments to outside parties
such as charities. This idea of crime insurance with payments to
beneficiaries who are in no position to increase crime rates is a novel
one, but real experience with such a scheme is needed in order to
judge the success of this solution. We are satisfied that governments
fight terrorism with full force even when there is no threat of liability,
but real experience for an extended period of time is needed to assess
the claim that financial responsibility will make governments take
superior precautions against more mundane crimes. It is thus possible
that a useful byproduct of the contemporary inclination to provide
insurance against terrorism will, in a roundabout way, introduce the
idea of insuring against crime.

